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New Caledonia and Papua are not 
reviewed in this issue.
Fiji
The first nine months of 2014 in 
Fiji were dominated by preparations 
for the long-awaited 17 September 
election. In accordance with the 
“Strategic Framework for Change” 
set out in July 2009, a new constitu-
tion had been put in place in 2013 
(see Fraenkel 2014), but the associ-
ated electoral arrangements were 
finalized only in March 2014. In the 
same month, Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama stepped down as 
military commander and announced 
the formation of his new politi-
cal party, FijiFirst. Also in March, 
Rewa high chief Ro Teimumu Kepa 
became leader of the main Opposi-
tion party, the Social Democratic and 
Liberal Party (sodelpa, formerly the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua 
[sdl]). Initial polls released by the Fiji 
Sun’s Razor Research gave Bainima-
rama a commanding 79 percent 
lead and  suggested negligible sup-
port for sodelpa (Fiji Sun, 2 March 
2014), but these were widely consid-
ered untrustworthy. As the polling 
day drew closer, a Times-Tebbutt 
poll found 21 percent support for 
sodelpa and 45 percent for FijiFirst, 
implying that the gap was narrow-
ing and encouraging expectations of 
a pre election surge in support for the 
Opposition (Fiji Times, 6 Sept 2014). 
In the heated atmosphere of early 
September, Bainimarama expressed 
reservations about holding an election 
at all, accused sodelpa of exacerbat-
ing ethnic divisions and of planning 
to release 2000 coup leader George 
 Speight, and said that Suva would not 
be allowed to “burn” again (rnzi, 
4 Sept 2014; Fiji Sun, 4 Sept 2014; 
fbc, 11 Sept 2014). Heroic interpreta-
tions of the military’s response to the 
Speight coup of May 2000 had long 
been used to consolidate rank-and-file 
control in the army (see Bainimarama 
2014a). Now, in the context of the 
election campaign, these were used 
to remind the minority communities 
about the risk of instability in the 
event of a poor showing for FijiFirst. 
If the early September poll was 
correct, voter loyalties polarized in 
the weeks before the polls, with the 
smaller parties losing support. The 
final outcome gave FijiFirst 59.2 
percent of the national vote and 32 of 
the 50 parliamentary seats, a landslide 
victory. sodelpa had 15 seats and 
28.2 percent of the national vote. The 
only other party to cross the 5 percent 
threshold was the National Federa-
tion Party (nfp), which obtained the 
remaining 3 seats. The Fiji Labour 
Party (flp), which had obtained 39.2 
percent of the national vote in 2006, 
slumped to 2.4 percent. The People’s 
Democratic Party (pdp)—a breakaway 
from the flp—fared only slightly 
 better, with 3.2 percent. Predictably, 
given the high threshold, the two 
 independents obtained few votes. 
Owing to Fiji’s history of election-
triggered coups, fears of military inter-
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vention inevitably lurked in the back-
ground during the 2014 campaign, or 
at least they did so as long as the result 
was uncertain. Bainimarama’s replace-
ment as military commander, former 
Land Force Commander Brigadier 
Mosese Tikoitoga, said in April that 
the role of the Republic of Fiji Mili-
tary Forces (rfmf) was to defend the 
new constitution and that “whatever 
government the people choose, we will 
support it.” However, he also warned 
that “if people throw out the current 
constitution as current political parties 
are talking about—then they have 
thrown out the chance of avoiding 
coups” (Islands Business, April 2014; 
rnzi, 24 June 2014; FijiLive, 21 June 
2014). The desire to keep the military 
out of politics may have been genuine, 
but that commitment proved difficult 
to sustain, particularly for an institu-
tion as intertwined with the fabric of 
Fijian life as the rfmf. In July, the 
rfmf announced it was severing all 
ties with former military officer and 
sodelpa candidate Ratu Suliano 
Matanitobua after he appealed to the 
people of Namosi to put obligations 
to the vanua (indigenous system) over 
loyalties to the rfmf (FijiLive, 31 July 
2014). Immunities for actions taken 
during the 2006 coup and thereafter 
were entrenched in the 2013 Consti-
tution and these were as vital to the 
rfmf senior command as they were to 
the government leadership. Hence, the 
military top brass carefully guarded 
its rehabilitated constitutional respon-
sibility “to ensure at all times, the 
security, defence and well-being of 
Fiji and all Fijians” (Fiji Government 
2013, section 131 (2) [section 5 (1) 
provides that “all citizens of Fiji shall 
be known as Fijians”]). Shortly before 
the election, it was announced that the 
new commander was relocating to an 
office in Berkley Crescent, close to the 
nerve centers of government (Fiji Sun, 
12 June 2014). 
The 2014 election was fought using 
a new uniquely candidate-centered, 
open-list, proportional representa-
tion (pr) system. Open-list systems by 
definition center on choices of politi-
cal party as well as candidate, but 
Fiji’s ballot paper offered no obvious 
party choice whatsoever. Only the 
candidates’ allotted numbers were 
visible on the ballot papers, not their 
party affiliations. Nevertheless, as in 
Finland and Brazil, it was the party 
tallies that were indirectly critical for 
determining how many seats each 
party won. Individual candidate tallies 
were summed at the counting center 
to reach party tallies, thus determining 
how many seats each party obtained. 
Only after this calculation of party 
seat entitlements did the highest intra-
party personal votes determine which 
of each party’s candidates were elected 
(for further detail on the difference 
between open- and closed-list pr 
systems, see ace 2015). Also unusu-
ally for open-list pr systems, the 2014 
election was fought using a single 
national constituency (see the discus-
sion by electoral commissioner Father 
David Arms of a model using three, 
four, or five multimember constituen-
cies [Arms 2012]). The voting age was 
reduced from 21 to 18, and Fiji citi-
zens residing in other countries were 
for the first time entitled to vote. 
Most importantly, this was Fiji’s 
first general election without commu-
nal rolls. Ever since 1929, Fiji’s gen-
eral elections had separated “Fijians,” 
“Indians,” and “Others” by race, and 
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required each ethnic group to cast 
 ballots entailing choices of leaders 
within their communities (though 
often with supplementary votes cast 
in “cross-voting” [1966], “national” 
[1972–1987], or “open” [1999–2006] 
constituencies on a common roll). 
Within Fiji, this major 2014 change 
was often misleadingly described as 
serving to “eliminate racial voting,” 
largely because the latter had been 
one of Bainimarama’s 2012 “non-
negotiable” provisions expected of 
the new constitution (for a discussion 
of these deliberations, see Fraenkel 
2013). What the new electoral frame-
work did do was remove the insti-
tutional endorsement of race-based 
voting and end the long-standing 
gerrymander in favor of rural parts of 
the country. 
Voter registration in 2014 was up 
23 percent over 2006 levels, partly 
reflecting the new enfranchisement 
of those aged 18 to 21. Turnout 
was also high, averaging 84 percent, 
despite the abandonment of compul-
sory voting. The 5 percent threshold 
discouraged independents, who would 
have needed 24,819 votes to gain 
a single seat. If they failed to reach 
that threshold, votes for the smaller 
parties also entailed wasted votes. 
The Electoral Decree forbade can-
didates who had “been convicted of 
any offence under any law for which 
the maximum penalty is a term of 
imprisonment of 12 months or more” 
(Fiji Government 2014, section 23, 
paragraph 4). That ruled out deposed 
Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, who 
had served a one-year prison sentence 
in 2012–2013, and also disqualified 
flp leader and former Prime Minister 
Mahendra Chaudhry. Mr Chaudhry 
was convicted of exchange control 
fraud in early 2014, but eventu-
ally—after the election—he avoided a 
fifteen-month prison term by paying 
a fine of f$2 million (approximately 
us$1,080,000 in mid-2014). Without 
its longtime leader, the flp polled 
poorly. Its  former strongholds in the 
sugarcane belts of Ba (western Viti 
Levu) and Macuata (northern Vanua 
Levu) instead gave majority support to 
FijiFirst. 
Other would-be candidates were 
also prohibited from contesting. 
sodelpa’s preferred representa-
tive for the Lau Islands, sacked civil 
servant Anare Jale, had his nomina-
tion rejected on the grounds that 
(due to his termination) he had been 
working as a consultant in Solomon 
Islands and thus was claimed not to 
be, as required under a belated July 
amendment to the Electoral Decree, 
“ordinarily resident in Fiji for at least 
2 years immediately before being 
nominated” (Fiji Government 2014, 
section 23, paragraph 4[c]; pina, 4 
Aug 2014). 
Disagreement flared between the 
Electoral Commission and Supervisor 
of Elections Mohammed Saneem after 
the latter decided to allow FijiFirst’s 
Praveen Bala Kumar to contest, 
despite his being a public officer at the 
time of nomination, and to incorrectly 
disqualify one of the flp candidates 
(rnzi, 23 Aug 2014; FijiLive, 23 
Aug 2014). The commission tried to 
reverse both decisions, but the super-
visor said that their advice had come 
too late (rnzi, 26 Aug 2014; Islands 
Business, Aug 2014). The commis-
sioners boycotted the announcement 
of the National Candidate List on 23 
August and took the matter to court, 
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though the case was dismissed on 
the grounds that the three-day time 
limit for objections was valid in law 
(High Court of Fiji 2014). The dispute 
briefly threatened to ruin the credibil-
ity of the election administration, but 
resignations were avoided. Allegations 
of bias were inevitable: the supervi-
sor had close links to the attorney-
general, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, who 
had retained his position as minister 
of elections throughout the campaign 
despite simultaneously assuming the 
role of general-secretary of FijiFirst. 
Media censorship was gradu-
ally relaxed over 2012–2014 but 
remained an important constraint 
for the Opposition parties. The C J 
Patel–owned Fiji Sun and the state-
owned Fiji Broadcasting Corpora-
tion—run by the attorney-general’s 
brother, Riaz Sayed-Khaiyum—were 
strongly pro-government. Other media 
outlets, particularly the Fiji Times and 
Fiji Television, were kept in line by 
regular harassment through the courts 
or by controls over licensing arrange-
ments (FijiVillage, 27 Nov 2012; 
rnzi, 6 June 2012). Self-censorship 
had become endemic, as journalists 
adjusted to controls under the 2010 
Media Industry Development Decree. 
Early in the campaign, Media 
Industry Development Authority 
Chairman Ashwin Raj threatened to 
take action against “hate speech” after 
Verata chief Ratu Timoci Vesikula 
publicly appealed to Bainimarama not 
to trust his newfound Fiji-Indian allies 
on the grounds that the two communi-
ties were as dissimilar as “kerosene 
and water” (Repúblika 2014). Instead 
of taking the opportunity to emphasize 
FijiFirst’s multiethnic agenda, Baini-
marama had reportedly sat unmoved 
through Vesikula’s speech in Verata. 
The hornet’s nest had been stirred 
only on the prime minister’s return 
to Suva, where the favored reaction 
was punitive rather than political. 
On election night, Raj had no qualms 
about appearing on Fiji tv as an overt 
supporter of FijiFirst. 
FijiFirst’s strategy was to seek 
to maximize the personal vote for 
Bainimarama, who was able to obtain 
202,459 votes (40.8% of the national 
vote, or 68.9% of the FijiFirst vote). 
The party’s campaign propaganda 
focused on the politics of modern-
ization, and described opponents as 
“dirty,” “old,” and “corrupt” politi-
cians who were together forming a 
“coalition of the hypocrites” (Baini-
marama 2014b; fbc, 21 Jan 2014). 
FijiFirst was registered in May with 
40,083 signatures, well in excess of 
the 5,000 required under the Political 
Parties Decree (Fiji tv News, 5 May 
2014; FijiLive, 19 May 2014). 
On the campaign trail, Bainima-
rama contested claims that his govern-
ment would undermine security of 
native land tenure or dismantle indig-
enous traditional institutions. The 
prime minister’s fund-raising meetings 
in Auckland and Sydney in August 
were well attended, as were rallies 
held in the towns of western Viti Levu. 
In a departure from his usual critical 
stance toward the government, Profes-
sor Wadan Narsey—an economist 
terminated from the University of the 
South Pacific in obedience to political 
pressures—described Bainimarama on 
the campaign trail as “like a man pos-
sessed, travelling the length and breath 
of Fiji as no previous elected leader 
has done, addressing local community 
needs in education, health, roads, 
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water etc. some of it quite positive for 
Fiji’s development,” and speculating 
“who knows, he may be a changed 
man in parliament, like Rabuka” 
(Narsey 2014b). (Sitiveni Rabuka 
was the 1987 coup leader who later 
embraced the 1997 Constitution and 
formed an alliance with the main 
Fiji-Indian Opposition leader, Jai Ram 
Reddy.) During the early years of its 
tenure, the Bainimarama administra-
tion had been deeply unpopular within 
the ethnic Fijian community. Acutely 
aware of this and the fact that ethnic 
Fijians now formed around 60 percent 
of the population, the government 
had become adept at micromanaging 
loyalties, through both intimidation 
and enticements and by making great 
play of public acquiescence by former 
adversaries (including videos of such 
events posted on YouTube by the 
 Ministry of Information). 
Economic recovery after 2010 
greatly assisted the government’s 
efforts to cultivate support among 
 former opponents. Gross domestic 
product was estimated to have grown 
by 4.6 percent in 2013 and by 3.8 
percent in 2014 (imf 2014, 4). Tax 
 revenue was up 17.3 percent for the 
year ending September 2014. Govern-
ment debt levels had declined since 
2013 but, if the liabilities of state-
owned corporations are included, 
were still close to 80 percent of gross 
domestic product (adb 2014). The 
budget deficit stood at 7.8 percent 
for 2014, according to International 
Monetary Fund (imf) estimates, but 
this rested on uncertain expectations 
of state asset sales that were to be 
delayed until after the election (imf 
2014, 5). That budget had given 
substantial pay raises to civil servants. 
In the run-up to the election, the 
government distributed large numbers 
of sewing machines, brush cutters, 
and chainsaws mostly to indigenous 
villagers. New roads around eastern 
Viti Levu and northern Vanua Levu 
cultivated support among those long 
accustomed to official neglect. Subsi-
dized primary education and free bus 
fares for school children encouraged 
the depiction of the incumbents as a 
development-oriented administration 
intent on lifting living standards. 
The sodelpa campaign empha-
sized threats to Fijian landownership 
and the negative experience of many 
in the indigenous community during 
the eight years since the December 
2006 coup. Alongside party leader Ro 
Teimumu Kepa (Roko Tui Dreketi), 
other prominent candidates were 
also from the traditional chiefly 
hierarchy, including the Tui Cakau, 
Ratu  Naiqama Lalabalavu, from 
Cakaudrove. sodelpa was deeply 
hostile to the 2013 Constitution and 
its declaration of Fiji as a “secular 
state.” The party wanted to rein-
state the disbanded Great Council of 
Chiefs and revive the Qoliqoli Bill, 
a controversial piece of legislation 
drafted under the Qarase government 
and aimed at increasing indigenous 
incomes accruing from coastal and 
reef areas (sodelpa 2014; rnzi, 
22 July 2014). These policy stances 
appealed largely to older Fijians, but 
less so to younger and newly enfran-
chised Fijians. 
Bainimarama succeeded in put-
ting sodelpa on the defensive on key 
issues, such as the party’s proposals 
to turn Fiji into a “Christian state.” 
Claims that FijiFirst would privatize 
communally held land were countered 
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by highlighting land sales under previ-
ous ethno-nationalist governments, 
including the Momi Bay and Denarau 
tourism developments in western Viti 
Levu. A letter circulated to all fifty-
six divisions of the Methodist Church 
warning voters not to be “swayed” by 
“the developments carried out” gener-
ated a furious reaction by the prime 
minister (Fiji Sun, 25 Sept 2014; fbc, 
25 Sept 2014). 
On key issues where the govern-
ment was potentially vulnerable, such 
as government corruption and the 
declaration of personal assets required 
under the Political Parties Decree, 
sodelpa failed to put strong pressure 
on Bainimarama and cabinet ministers 
contesting under the FijiFirst banner. 
Critically, this was the first Fiji general 
election fought by a mainstream 
indigenous party from a position 
in Opposition. In all previous elec-
tions, the largest ethnic Fijian–backed 
party had always campaigned as the 
incumbent, increasing the likelihood 
that potentially dissident areas would 
render grudging support. Whenever 
out of government, the mainstream 
indigenous party had been returned by 
way of a constitutional crisis (1977) 
or a coup (in 1987 and 2000). Con-
testing from a position in Opposi-
tion required a set of political skills 
quite different from those employed 
at previous elections, and these were 
not easily learned in the run up to the 
September 2014 polls. 
Polling took place on a single day, 
17 September, in contrast to the previ-
ous practice of allowing a week for the 
casting of ballots. The task was eased 
by “pre-polling” of fifty thousand 
voters, mostly those on outer islands 
and in isolated parts of the interior. A 
two-day preelection media blackout 
was rigorously enforced. On the main 
Election Day itself, polling was con-
ducted reasonably smoothly, but the 
announcement of provisional tallies 
phoned in from the polling stations 
was poorly handled. Counting was 
abruptly halted early on 18 Septem-
ber and recommenced from scratch, 
based instead on the more reliable 
official paperwork sent in from the 
polling venues. Many citizens were left 
bewildered, and they were encouraged 
in this sentiment by defeated politi-
cians’ allegations of malpractice (see 
the report in The Australian, 18 Sept 
2014).
The multinational observer group 
(mog), led by Australia, Indonesia, 
and India—eager to offer an early 
initial verdict and in some cases to 
quickly depart the country—called a 
press conference at 4 pm on 18 Sep-
tember before the full results had offi-
cially been announced. The observers 
declared the election “credible,” said 
that “the conditions were in place for 
Fijians to exercise their right to vote 
freely,” and concluded that the result 
was on track to “broadly represent the 
will of the people” (FijiLive, 18 Sept 
2014). Aware of the impending mog 
event, the Opposition parties called 
a rival press conference outside the 
counting center at the fmf Dome, also 
at 4 pm on 18 September, and claimed 
evidence of ballot rigging and electoral 
fraud. One Fiji leader, Filimoni Vosa-
rogo, whose party had secured only 
1.2 percent of the national vote, failed 
to turn up at the Opposition press 
conference. In the days that followed, 
the initial shock felt at FijiFirst’s 
landslide victory faded, and the pdp 
withdrew from the joint press state-
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ment (FijiVillage, 22 Sept 2014). The 
final Opposition statement contained 
claims of election irregularities (flp-
nfp-sodelpa 2014), but the super-
visor and the chair of the Electoral 
Commission competently accounted 
for most of these (Fijian Electoral 
Commission 2014; Fiji Times, 21 Sept 
2014). No evidence was presented by 
the Opposition showing how alleged 
misdemeanors had influenced the 
overall result. Ultimately, no disputed 
returns were lodged with the courts. 
Geographically, support for Fiji-
First was reasonably evenly spread 
across the country, in both urban and 
rural areas, and in both the poorer 
settlements and richer suburbs (for 
more detail, see Fraenkel 2015). Of 
the four divisions, sodelpa had 
majority backing (63.2%) only in the 
Eastern Division (covering the Lau 
and Lomaiviti island groups), despite 
a FijiFirst majority on tiny Rotuma 
(administratively counted as part of 
the Eastern Division despite being 
in the country’s extreme northwest). 
sodelpa also had a sizable share 
of support in the Northern Division 
(36.2%), particularly in the rural areas 
of Vanua Levu. These are parts of the 
country with relatively small popula-
tions, where indigenous villagers are 
mostly engaged in subsistence culti-
vation and fishing, and from which 
there exist high rates of outmigra-
tion to the Suva-Nausori corridor. By 
contrast, FijiFirst had 68.8 percent of 
the vote in the Western Division and 
55.9 percent of the vote in the Central 
 Division. These are the most densely 
populated areas, with the lion’s share 
of the country’s formal sector jobs. 
Taken together, the Eastern and 
Northern accounted for 18.8 percent 
of the vote, while the Western and 
Central divisions accounted for 79.7 
percent. The residual, 1.4 percent, was 
made up of postal  ballots, of which 55 
percent were cast for FijiFirst. 
Parliament was no longer to sit at 
the magnificent purpose-built com-
plex out at Veiuto, the epicenter of 
George Speight’s failed May 2000 
coup. Instead, the assembly was to 
be  relocated to its pre-1987 home in 
Government Buildings in central Suva, 
a shift symbolic of efforts to end the 
twenty-seven-year-old so-called coup 
culture by returning to the venue 
where soldiers had first wielded guns 
to depose an elected government. 
Bainimarama’s government would 
no longer be conducted by decree 
but would be constrained to operate 
through parliamentary procedure. 
It was to prove a difficult transi-
tion. After the election, Bainimarama 
spoke—without magnanimity—about 
meeting again in Parliament with 
the “losers” and “liars I met on the 
campaign trail” (Fiji Sun, 19 Sept 
2014; FijiLive, 24 Sept 2014). No 
olive branch would be extended to the 
Opposition parties.
The new Speaker was Jiko Luveni, 
who stood down as a FijiFirst mem-
ber of Parliament to take up the post. 
Ro Teimumu Kepa became leader of 
the Opposition. The nfp’s Dr Biman 
Prasad was made shadow finance min-
ister and chair of the Public Accounts 
Committee, tasked with reviewing the 
thirty-two auditor-general reports cov-
ering 2007–2013 that were published 
soon after the election (oag 2014). 
Among those reports was evidence of 
major expenditures over budget by the 
rfmf and confirmation that ministe-
rial salaries had for years been paid 
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outside normal channels through Aliz 
Pacific, an accounting firm owned 
by Nur Bano Ali, the aunt of the 
attorney-general (Auditor-General’s 
Report 2010, volume 2, section 4, 
page 11; Narsey 2014a; Fraenkel 
2012). In the new parliament, Aiyaz 
Sayed-Khaiyum would play a prime 
ministerial-style role, as well as serving 
as attorney-general (a post he only 
briefly relinquished to Faiyaz Koya 
but then reassumed within a few days) 
and holding the portfolios for finance, 
public enterprises, public service, and 
communications. Bainimarama would 
continue to play a more presidential 
role, traveling regularly overseas and 
touring Fiji on official visits. 
Parliamentary proceedings were 
to be live-streamed on the Internet. 
November 2014 was the budget 
 sitting, with the 2015 spending plans 
pushed through by way of the solid 
FijiFirst majority and in the face of a 
sodelpa walkout (Fiji Times, 9 Dec 
2014). Disagreement flared over a law 
to restrict urban land sales to foreign-
ers and—above all—when contrac-
tual disputes meant that the Fijian 
Sevens rugby team’s performance in 
Dubai could not be screened live on 
national tv. Potential lines of cross-
party linkage existed, but the consti-
tutional provision regarding forfeit of 
seats in the event of expulsion could 
be expected to stiffen party loyalties 
into the distant future. Much bad 
blood remained. In his maiden speech, 
sodelpa’s Niko Nawaikula said he 
“despised” the FijiFirst members of 
Parliament, called for another consti-
tutional review, and said that failure to 
do so would constitute “an invitation 
for another coup” (Hansard, 15 Oct 
2014). Bainimarama responded that 
the government would be “keeping an 
eye” on Nawaikula and threatened to 
bring him in “for questioning” (fbc, 
16 Oct 2014; FijiLive, 17 Oct 2014). 
Use of surveillance technologies 
was well known: Vodafone admitted 
to having allowed 760 Fiji phone taps 
in 2013 (The Guardian, 6 June 2014). 
Public justification of stiffer forms of 
repression had also become a familiar 
part of the political landscape, and 
this did not abate after the election. 
In 2013, the gruesome torture of two 
escaped prisoners by the security 
forces was shown in a widely circu-
lated video, but—to the horror of 
Amnesty International—the officers’ 
actions were publicly defended by 
Bainimarama (Amnesty International 
2014). In June 2014, military com-
mander Brigadier Tikoitoga justified 
beatings of opponents to “stave off 
civil disorder” (Tikoitoga, quoted in 
The Age, 20 June 2014). After the 
September election, the new police 
commissioner, Ben Groenewald, said 
he was investigating allegations that a 
sixty-year-old teacher, Josefa Bilitaki, 
had been assaulted by army officers. 
Bilitaki had allegedly sent angry text 
messages to Bainimarama, claiming 
that his songs had been used without 
authorization in FijiFirst’s campaign 
materials (abc, 1 Oct 2014). 
These were not isolated cases or 
departures from an otherwise nonvio-
lent ideology. At the October 2014 
postelection budget forum, FijiFirst 
supporters looked sympathetically 
to Lee Kwan Yew’s Singapore as a 
model of an initially impoverished 
and ethnically divided state where 
an “autocratic government” had 
needed “to suspend a large measure of 
their [citizens’] freedom” in order to 
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achieve long-run economic develop-
ment (Delaibatiki 2014). 
With Parliament once again sit-
ting, obstacles had been removed to 
a full rapprochement with Australia, 
New Zealand, and the European 
Union. Australian Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop had visited in February, 
signaling a warming of relations. After 
Bainimarama stepped down as rfmf 
commander in March, the remaining 
travel bans had been dropped, various 
aid-funded programs were announced, 
and Fiji was to be brought into the 
Australian seasonal workers’ program 
(The Australian, 15 Feb 2014). A 
“credible” election had been critical 
for both bilateral and multilateral 
partners, and the standards of what 
constituted “credibility” were not 
too exacting. The Asian Development 
Bank now promised us$350 million, 
and the World Bank was also poised 
to embark on a new program of 
lending, triggering expectations of an 
economic boom (fbc, 21 Oct 2014). 
The remaining Australian and New 
Zealand sanctions were now dropped. 
Fiji was readmitted to the Common-
wealth and allowed, if it chose to do 
so, to return to the Pacific Islands 
Forum. 
Earlier, Bainimarama had insisted 
that Fiji would not rejoin the Forum 
unless there was a major reorgani-
zation of the Pacific regional archi-
tecture, including the exclusion as 
 members of Australia and New 
Zealand. Keen to avoid any dispute, 
Australian Foreign Minister Bishop 
proposed a summit to address these 
concerns in early 2015. Diplomatic 
relations would meanwhile be  
restored between Canberra and 
Suva, including the exchange of 
high  commissioners (Kubuabola and 
Bishop 2014). 
Not everything on the diplomatic 
front was plain sailing. Frictions with 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) continued 
with a dispute over the selection of 
Dame Meg Taylor as the Forum’s new 
secretary-general instead of former 
Fiji Foreign Minister Kaliopate Tavola 
(abc, 7 Aug 2014). “Backstabbed” 
was the Fiji Sun’s headline (4 Aug 
2014), echoing claims that PNG Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill had reneged on 
a deal with Fiji. Yet even this could 
not overshadow the pinnacle of Baini-
marama’s 2014 success in projecting 
himself as a regional leader. On route 
from the Group of 20 (g20) summit 
in Brisbane, both Chinese President 
Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi visited Fiji at different 
points in November, hosting summits 
in the country also with other Pacific 
Island leaders. Modi addressed the 
new Parliament, though the session 
was unwisely boycotted by sodelpa’s 
fifteen members.
Commentators speculated that 
the timing of these diplomatic visits 
was triggered by Sino-Indian ten-
sions and claimed that New Delhi felt 
“threatened by China’s expanding 
presence in this Indo-Pacific region” 
(Balaji Chandramohan, quoted by 
rnzi, 11 Nov 2014). More plausibly, 
Fiji’s heightened diplomatic activity 
on the world stage (including new 
embassies across the globe, 2013 
chairmanship of the Group of 77 
[g77], and the establishment of the 
Suva-based Pacific Islands Develop-
ment Forum; see Firth 2013), as well 
as the Fiji government’s willingness 
to take an independent stance from 
Australia, enhanced its attractive-
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ness as a stopping-off point in the 
age of US President Barrack Obama’s 
so-called pivot or rebalancing toward 
the Asia-Pacific. Other regional play-
ers too were keen to respond to the 
perceived heightened geostrategic 
significance of Fiji. Also in November, 
Australia’s defense-funded think tank, 
the Australian Strategic Policy Insti-
tute, proposed that Canberra fund a 
regional peacekeeping center at Black 
Rock Camp in Nadi (The Australian, 
24 Nov 2014). A succession of senior 
military officers from Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States visited 
Fiji in late 2014, eager to rejuve-
nate defense linkages now that the 
perceived political impediments had 
been removed. Fiji thus entered 2015 
with the context much changed from 
that at the start of 2014, both on the 
domestic and international fronts, but 
it remained a country deeply unsettled. 
jon fraenkel
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Papua New Guinea
The year 2014 marks another period 
in Papua New Guinea’s political 
history that saw a number of unprec-
edented challenges facing the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. 
An accountant by profession who has 
held various senior ministerial portfo-
lios in previous governments, O’Neill 
is the leader of the People’s National 
Congress (pnc) Party and was sworn 
in as prime minister on 4 August 2012 
after a period of political impasse that 
saw the deposition of the government 
of Sir Michael Somare, the country’s 
founding prime minister, who had 
enjoyed the prodigious feat of almost 
ten years in power.
After the 2012 election, the 
O’Neill government made a num-
ber of significant domestic invest-
ments and regional commitments, 
 exhibiting Papua New Guinea’s 
clout as the rising regional power. As 
Papua New Guinea expects to host 
the Pacific Games in July 2015 and 
the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (apec) meeting of world lead-
ers in 2018, the government looked 
toward China’s construction industry, 
awarding a bulk of the construction 
contracts to major Chinese compa-
nies to fulfill its endeavor of hav-
ing the necessary infrastructure in 
place to cater for these major events. 
China’s  investment in the coun-
try has expanded exponentially; in 
2014, almost 80 percent of China’s 
EximBank loan and project financ-
ing component in the Pacific region 
was dedicated to Papua New Guinea 
(Middleton 2014). This goes to show 
the country’s economic  prominence 
among Pacific Island nations, owing 
much to its mineral, forestry, and fish-
eries resources.
Although Papua New Guinea ranks 
as the second-biggest recipient of 
Australian Aid (AusAID) after Indo-
nesia, Prime Minister O’Neill contin-
ues to make aid commitments to other 
Pacific Island countries. The PNG 
government declared at the September 
2013 Pacific Islands Forum meeting in 
Majuro that in 2014 it would intro-
duce a special budget allocation to 
fund a regional development assistance 
program. The announcement was 
followed by O’Neill’s proclamation 
of “ongoing support to the Govern-
ment of Marshall Islands, with a us$1 
million grant to assist with Forum 
costs” and to assist with droughts and 
flooding that affected the atoll nation 
(Maclellan 2013).
Noting that Papua New Guinea had 
provided assistance to Sāmoa after 
Cyclone Evan in 2012, O’Neill also 
announced the allocation of k5 million 
each to Tuvalu and Tonga for pro-
grams in climate change assistance and 
cyclone relief, respectively. (In 2014, 
one PNG kina [k] averaged us$.38.) 
In addition to these direct grants, 
Papua New Guinea was also support-
ing smaller Pacific nations through 
regional agreements such as the Parties 
to the Nauru Agreement on regional 
fisheries (Maclellan 2013).
In May, Exxon Mobil PNG Ltd 
sent the first shipment of 80,000 
tonnes of liquefied natural gas (lng) 
to Japan. Prime Minister O’Neill 
stated that Papua New Guinea has 
been elevated to the exclusive club of 
nations that produce and export lng. 
The economic growth of the project 
resulted in the employment and train-
ing of thousands of locals, more than 
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k10 billion spent on the project, and 
hundreds of millions of kina invested 
in infrastructure and community 
programs. It was expected that the 
benefits would flow to landown-
ers through the payment of royalties 
(O’Neill 2014; The National, 15 May 
2014). 
Although the first lng shipment 
marked a milestone for Papua New 
Guinea, the government acknowledged 
that the country would not see actual 
profits from lng export immediately, 
but rather in the next few years. As 
revenue trickles in, it is crucial that 
the government not lose sight of the 
value of the PNG Sovereign Wealth 
Fund initiated by the last government. 
The organic law establishing this 
fund “was designed to ensure that all 
 government revenues from minerals 
and petroleum passed through a stabi-
lisation fund prior to flowing through 
to the National Budget in accordance 
with a specified formula, and that 
PNG lng dividends accruing to the 
PNG Government would be paid 
into a development fund for PNG’s 
economic and social development” 
(Osborne 2014).
Among the many issues that 
haunted the government were the 
prime minister’s arrest warrant as a 
result of a letter supposedly signed 
by him authorizing illegal payments 
to one of the biggest PNG law firms, 
Paul Paraka Lawyers, and O’Neill’s 
signing of a k3 billion Union Bank of 
Switzerland (ubs) loan purportedly 
without following the Public Finance 
Act procedures and seeking the 
endorsement of the National Execu-
tive Council (nec). 
The investigation of the prime min-
ister by the Investigation Task Force 
Sweep (itfs), which was established 
by the National Executive Council 
in 2011, became one of the most 
controversial issues of the year. The 
itfs investigation looked into a letter 
signed by the prime minister autho-
rizing a payment of k71.8 million to 
lawyer Paul Paraka’s firm. The prime 
minister, however, claimed that the 
signature on the letter authorizing the 
payment was a forgery. In late 2013, 
the principal of the law firm had been 
charged with eighteen counts of alleg-
edly receiving a$30 million (us$29 
million) in fraudulent payments from 
the PNG government (Radio Australia 
2013).
In June 2014, police attempted to 
arrest Prime Minister O’Neill after 
the Investigation Task Force Sweep 
received the findings of an analysis 
of the prime minister’s signature 
by a Sydney forensic analysis com-
pany, confirming that the signature 
was O’Neill’s (Cochrane 2014). The 
attempted arrest of the prime minister 
spiraled into a flurry of court injunc-
tions challenging the process by which 
the referral was made and questioning 
the impartiality of the police fraud 
squad, labeling the move as “politi-
cally motivated”; this became the 
catchphrase used by other members 
of Parliament who were also referred 
to the Ombudsman Commission or 
accused of other instances of alleged 
misconduct. 
The prime minister was served 
a warrant of arrest and ordered to 
present himself to the Police Fraud 
Squad for an interview. Police Com-
missioner Toami Kulunga at that time 
had recently taken leave, after the 
court found him guilty of contempt 
for having failed to follow a National 
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Court order to reinstate another police 
officer, Geoffrey Vaki, who himself 
was suspended for a disciplinary case 
(Papua New Guinea Today 2014). 
In a dramatic turn of events, the 
National Executive Council replaced 
Kulunga, who had voluntarily stepped 
down after his conviction, with 
 Geoffrey Vaki as acting police com-
missioner (The National, 17 July 
2014). As soon as Vaki was appointed, 
he immediately suspended Assistant 
Police Commissioner for Crimes 
Thomas Eluh, who was leading the 
Police Fraud Squad, along with other 
members of the squad. This action 
raised doubts as to the impartiality of 
the new police commissioner. When 
Vaki allegedly failed to enforce the 
warrant of arrest for Prime Minister 
O’Neill, the fraud squad immedi-
ately instituted contempt proceedings 
against the police commissioner (PNG 
Post-Courier, 29 July 2014).
The National Executive Council is 
chaired by the prime minister and his 
cabinet ministers, who met soon after 
and resolved to have the Investigation 
Task Force Sweep disbanded. In July, 
the National Court issued a permanent 
stop order preventing the nec deci-
sion regarding the itfs disbanding. 
Sam Koim, the itfs chairman, filed an 
application in court to review two nec 
decisions, the first concerning the itfs 
disbanding, and a second regarding 
the establishment of an Interim Office 
for Anti-Corruption to replace the 
Investigation Task Force Sweep (PNG 
Post-Courier, 29 July 2014).
The National Court also stayed 
the arrest of Prime Minister O’Neill 
pending the hearing of a constitu-
tional reference at the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court reference was 
to establish whether Police Commis-
sioner Vaki had standing to challenge 
the validity of a warrant of arrest 
obtained by a Police Fraud Squad 
 officer for the arrest of the prime 
minister. The reference stemmed from 
a judicial review application filed by 
Vaki to challenge the District Court’s 
decision that issued the warrant for 
the arrest of O’Neill with regard to 
the letter approving an alleged fraudu-
lent payment to Paul Paraka Lawyers 
(PNG Post-Courier, 21 July 2014).
After the disbanding of the itfs, 
the prime minister also announced the 
setting up of a Commission of Inquiry, 
to be headed by retired Australian 
judge Justice Warwick Andrews, to 
investigate the controversial payments 
to Paraka Lawyers (Islands Business 
2014a).
The prime minister’s decision not to 
step down and the itfs disbanding led 
to growing calls from former Attor-
ney General Kerenga Kua, Opposi-
tion Leader Belden Namah, and the 
general public for O’Neill to resign 
(Islands Business 2014c). In June, 
Prime Minister O’Neill had removed 
Kua and replaced him with Minister 
Ano Pala. The prime minister, in a 
meeting with Kua, explained that he 
was sacking him because of Kua’s 
unwillingness “to amend section 145 
of the constitution to further restrict 
the rights of members of parliament 
to move a motion of no confidence, to 
restrict the nomination of an alterna-
tive candidate as pm to the ruling 
party, [and] for allegedly instructing 
the solicitor general to act against the 
interests of the Prime Minister” (PNG 
Facts website 2014). 
In November, Attorney General 
and Minister of Justice Ano Pala 
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was charged with having conspired 
with others on 11 July to pervert the 
course of justice in relation to the 
Paraka Lawyers legal bills payments 
case. However, he obtained interim 
injunctions from the National Court 
“restraining the police from executing 
that warrant of arrest until his  matter 
was heard and determined” (PNG 
Post-Courier, 14 Nov 2014).
The Pacific Islands Forum leaders at 
their retreat in July appointed Papua 
New Guinea’s Dame Meg Taylor as 
the new Forum secretary-general, the 
first female to be appointed to the 
position. Dame Taylor was serving as 
a senior official at the World Bank’s 
International Financial Corporation. 
The Pacific leaders also announced 
that Papua New Guinea would be 
hosting the 46th Pacific Island Leaders 
Forum in 2015.
Election petitions with the Court 
of Disputed Returns continued to 
haunt many members of Parliament 
(mps) with challenges to 2012 elec-
tion results. This has been one of the 
negative features of the PNG electoral 
system and has prevented mps from 
fully performing their roles in deliver-
ing goods and services.
One of those election petition cases 
is that of the Madang Open electorate. 
In June 2013, the election of Nixon 
Duban was voided by the National 
Court due to allegations of bribery of 
potential voters. Duban is a member 
of Prime Minister O’Neill’s pnc Party 
and was minister for police (Albaniel-
Evara 2013). A by-election was called, 
and Duban won the election, return-
ing to his portfolio as police minister. 
The challenge was not over, however, 
as Madang businessman Peter Yama 
filed another petition, arguing that 
6,116 ballot papers containing serial 
numbers at the back with bar codes 
were found at a public cemetery (PNG 
Post-Courier, 29 July 2014). 
In July, the Office of the Registrar 
of Political Parties Dr Alphonse Gelu 
announced that there would be certain 
changes to the Organic Law on Integ-
rity of Political Parties and Candidates 
that would also see constitutional 
amendments for the registrar’s office 
to access bank accounts of individual 
mps and political parties. The changes 
will address party and candidates’ 
accounts, fundraising, and donations 
from businesses and other organiza-
tions (PNG Post-Courier, 25 July 
2014). While this approach may be 
applauded as a way forward in hold-
ing mps and political parties account-
able and promoting transparency, 
particularly when it comes to election-
related funding, it also raises issues of 
privacy and the constitutionality of 
accessing mps’ private bank accounts. 
There is to be yet more consultation 
on the legal basis of this proposal as 
well as more discussions with other 
relevant stakeholders, such as banks 
and financial institutions, on laws 
regulating confidentiality and privacy.
In August 2014, the National 
 Executive Council suspended the 
Clerk of Parliament Vela Konivaro 
over  serious allegations of finan-
cial mismanagement (PNG Post-
Courier, 8 Aug 2014). It surfaced 
that  Konivaro also was involved 
in manipulating and changing the 
content of draft bills that came before 
the National Executive Council to be 
presented in Parliament. This was con-
sidered a very serious allegation, given 
 Konivaro’s title. 
The government takeover of the 
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PNG Sustainable Development Pro-
gram (pngsdp) emerged as another 
highlight of the year. In early 2014, 
the government discovered that 
pngsdp, under the chairmanship of 
former Prime Minister Sir Mekere 
Morauta, had removed any represen-
tation by the PNG Government and 
the people of Western Province from 
its board when it met in Australia 
and had also amended its Articles of 
Association, specifically article 24(b), 
which provides for the appointment 
of directors by the PNG government 
(Islands Business 2014b). 
The pngsdp had been set up after 
the exit of mining company bhp from 
the Ok Tedi mine in Western Province. 
The main tasks of the pngsdp were 
(1) to invest two-thirds of Ok Tedi’s 
dividends into a long-term fund to 
be available to the people of Western 
Province after the closure of the mine 
and (2) to spend the other one-third 
on development projects throughout 
Papua New Guinea (Howes 2013).
When the action taken by pngsdp 
to allegedly remove PNG representa-
tion from its board was discovered, 
the government unanimously passed 
legislation in Parliament to give Papua 
New Guinea ownership of the coun-
try’s largest company, Ok Tedi Mining 
Ltd, and control over pngsdp as the 
second-largest development organi-
zation. This also led to the sacking 
of Chairman Morauta. The PNG 
shares are in a trust fund registered in 
Singapore as a public company, and 
the government’s taking ownership of 
them did not go without a challenge 
from pngsdp, which took action in 
the Singapore Supreme Court against 
the state for what it claimed was a 
continuing breach of court rules. 
Morauta argued that Prime Minister 
O’Neill was continuing to issue false 
statements (PNG Post-Courier, 4 
Sept 2014). The pngsdp commenced 
legal action against the state in the 
Singapore courts and also in the 
International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. In May 2014, 
the Singapore High Court dismissed 
the state’s application to appoint a 
receiver to take control of pngsdp 
assets.
As the country prepares to host 
major events such as the Pacific 
Games and the apec meeting, national 
law enforcement and security agencies 
have been tasked to improve security 
and intelligence capacity to show 
that Papua New Guinea is capable of 
ensuring and having necessary security 
arrangements in place for these events. 
The country’s response to such reports 
is crucial to show that its national 
agencies are able to act swiftly to 
address any terrorist concerns in the 
country.
In September, in response to a 
headline article in the local news paper, 
the PNG Post-Courier, the prime 
minister ordered national agencies 
to investigate alleged international 
terrorist links in the country. This 
followed media reports of a Middle 
Eastern family with alleged ties to 
terrorists that has invested in Papua 
New Guinea over the past ten years. 
The report stated that at least three 
companies with Australia-based 
principals had family members who 
were connected with terrorist activities 
(PNG Post-Courier, 4 Sept 2014). A 
task force led by the National Intel-
ligence Organisation was set up to 
lead the investigations. The task force 
was given thirty days to conduct the 
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investigation, take appropriate action 
to dismantle the alleged terrorist 
network, and report on the outcome 
of actions taken (PNG Post-Courier, 
12 Sept 2014).
Also in September, the National 
Executive Council approved the 
expenditure of a massive k2 billion 
over the next ten years for a complete 
overhaul of the police force’s opera-
tional activities. A committee will 
comprise top police hierarchy to look 
at all police needs and priorities (PNG 
Post-Courier, 4 Sept 2014).
As the government continues with 
major infrastructural developments 
in the capital, Port Moresby, it also 
endeavors to connect the capital to 
other provinces by road. The road 
network among most provinces is 
still nonexistent. However, the gov-
ernment’s proposed highway to con-
nect the highlands provinces to Port 
Moresby and the Papuan region was 
met with stiff resistance from  political 
leaders, especially from the latter 
region. This has somewhat rekindled 
secessionist sentiments in the Papua 
Besena movement of the 1970s by 
astute Papua secessionist leader and 
former mp Dame Josephine Abaijah 
(PNG Post-Courier, 3 Nov 2014). 
In another controversy facing  
Prime Minister O’Neill, the gov-
ernment obtained a loan of k3 bil-
lion from the global finance service 
company Union Bank of Switzerland 
(ubs) to buy shares in the company 
Oil Search Ltd. Commentators say 
that not only is the loan economically 
unwise but the manner in which the 
loan was obtained also breached the 
relevant laws of the country. It was 
argued that the process of obtaining 
the loan breached section 209 of the 
constitution in that the Parliament, 
which authorizes such loans, did not 
do so in this case through the annual 
 budget process. It was believed that 
the proceeds from the lng project 
were mortgaged toward repaying the 
loan and that the country will not 
benefit from the project until years 
after the loan has been repaid (Yalo 
2014). However, the prime minister 
maintains that there was nothing 
improper in obtaining the loan and 
the government had complied with all 
relevant laws. He also claimed that the 
purchase of shares would benefit the 
nation  (Walton 2014). 
In August, Public Prosecutor 
Pondros Kaluwin received the refer-
ral of Prime Minister O’Neill from 
the Ombudsman Commission to 
determine whether there was suffi-
cient, credible, and cogent evidence 
to ask the chief justice to appoint 
a Leadership Tribunal. The refer-
ral was for alleged misconduct in 
office (PNG Post-Courier, 14 Aug 
2014). The subject of the referral 
relates to  allegations that (1) the 
prime minister had failed to comply 
with adminis trative and financial 
processes,  including normal overseas 
borrowing processes in the approval 
of the ubs k3 billion loan; (2) the 
prime minister had sacked former 
Minister for  Treasury Don Polye, 
accusing the  minister in the media 
of causing instability in the govern-
ment, when the actual reason was 
Polye’s refusal to sign the ubs loan 
deal, which the prime minister had 
unilaterally approved on 6 March 
2014; and (3) the prime minister had 
made a  misleading  statement on local 
television station emtv that he had 
obtained advice from state  agencies 
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including Bank of Papua New Guinea 
on the ubs loan to purchase Oil 
Search shares, which was contrary to 
the evidence received (PNG Post- 
Courier, 14 Aug 2014).
The Ombudsman Commission 
investigated the prime minister’s 
alleged misconduct in office, which 
arose from his failure to uphold his 
duties and responsibilities of office 
as required under section 27 of 
the Constitution and the Organic 
Law on Duties and Responsibili-
ties of  Leadership. The Ombudsman 
 Commission was satisfied that there 
was a prima facie case and conse-
quently made the referral to Public 
Prosecutor Kaluwin.
Among the politicians charged 
for misappropriation was Komo-
Magarima mp Francis Potape. The 
National Court found Potape has a 
case to answer in relation to alleged 
misappropriation of k60,000 (PNG 
Post-Courier, 14 Aug 2014). In Octo-
ber, the National Court found Potape 
guilty of misusing k330,000 in public 
funds, of which k60,000 was awarded 
to himself as an allowance. He was 
sentenced to thirty months in prison 
(The National 2014).
In October, Gulf Province Gov-
ernor Havila Kavo was also found 
guilty of misusing k130,000 from a 
trust account belonging to the people 
of Kikori district for infrastructure, 
and he was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment (Mathias 2014).
Earlier in April the National Court 
had sentenced former Finance Minis-
ter and mp Paul Tiensten to nine years 
with hard labor for misappropriat-
ing k10 million in public funds. His 
 sentence was the most severe penalty 
any PNG Court has given to a con-
victed corrupt public official since 
PNG independence.
In December, Kandep mp Don 
Polye became the new Opposition 
leader when the six-member Opposi-
tion caucus called a meeting without 
the former leader, Vanimo-Green mp 
Belden Namah. Namah disputed the 
election of Polye by Opposition caucus 
members; however, Polye’s election 
was recognized by Speaker of Parlia-
ment Theo Zurenuoc (PNG Post-
Courier 2014). 
The Manus Island Regional Pro-
cessing Centre, which was reopened 
in 2012, continues to raise the ire of 
human rights groups against Austra-
lia’s transfer of irregular maritime 
arrivals (or “boat people”) to Manus 
Island in Papua New Guinea. The 
Australian government aims to com-
bat people smuggling by seeking PNG 
support in this regional approach. On 
19 July 2013, the Australian and PNG 
governments entered into a Regional 
Resettlement Agreement, which states 
that Australia would transfer asylum 
seekers who have arrived by boat to 
Papua New Guinea for processing of 
their asylum claims, and that Papua 
New Guinea, not Australia, would 
settle, on a permanent basis, those 
asylum seekers who are determined 
to be refugees (PNG icsa 2013). On 
6 August 2013, the PNG and Aus-
tralian governments entered into a 
new memorandum of understanding, 
which supports the resettlement agree-
ment and supersedes the memoran-
dum of understanding of 8 September 
2012 (mou 2013).
The operations of the Manus 
Regional Processing Centre and the 
Regional Resettlement Agreement 
policy brought the Australian immi-
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gration policy on offshore processing 
centers to a low point and became a 
focus of controversy for the Australian 
and PNG governments on the treat-
ment of asylum seekers after a riot at 
the processing center in February 2014 
led to the death of Iranian asylum 
seeker Reza Barati, allegedly caused 
by security personnel working at the 
center (The Guardian 2015). Austra-
lian and PNG authorities commenced 
separate investigations into the death 
of Barati and have identified the 
alleged perpetrators, but they have yet 
to be prosecuted.
While the O’Neill government 
deserved praise for a number of 
important milestones in terms of 
meeting the government’s prioritized 
 policies and development plans and 
the government’s commitment to 
investment and economic growth, 
there continue to be significant 
 challenges to ensuring that major deci-
sions affecting the country are made 
within defined procedures, policies, 
and the rule of law. 
The fight against corruption is yet 
to be tangibly seen, when the dis-
banding of the itfs team and delay 
in the establishment of institutions 
such as the Office of Anti-Corrup-
tion  continue to engender a loss of 
 confidence in the government in 
 tackling corruption. There remain 
many unresolved cases involving the 
prime minister, ministers of govern-
ment, and members of Parliament, 
with most of the cases often hampered 
by court processes. 
As Papua New Guinea enters a 
period of economic boom from its 
mineral resources and enjoys the 
proceeds from the lng project, the 
management of the country’s revenue 
and national purse will be critical to 
ensure that these dividends translate 
into tangible economic outcomes, not 
only changing the infrastructural face 
of Port Moresby but, most important, 
raising living standards and improving 
the livelihoods of those in rural areas 
by giving them the opportunity to 
participate in the country’s economic 
development.
solomon kantha
The views expressed in this review 
are those of the author and do not 
represent those of his employer, the 
PNG Immigration and Citizenship 
Service Authority.
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Solomon Islands
Solomon Islands sailed through 
another turbulent and attention-grab-
bing year in 2014. Natural disasters 
struck the country, arson and looting 
marred efforts to national unity, and a 
new government was formed. Notable 
events on which this review focuses 
are those leading up to and following 
the national general election. Indeed, 
this was a critical general election for 
a variety of reasons. It was the first 
election after the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) 
announced the commencement of its 
transition and gradual handover of 
policing control to the Royal Solo-
mon Islands Police Force (rsipf). It 
was also an election after civil society 
 organizations aired frustrations with 
a Parliament that had legitimated the 
channeling of state resources into the 
hands of legislators who were alleg-
edly not very prudent in their decision 
making. Moreover, the election was 
the first to be conducted after new 
legislation on political parties’ integ-
rity was passed and implemented, 
and it offers an opportunity to assess 
the impacts and effectiveness of that 
legislation. The election also offers 
the chance to comment on political 
stability and gender equality ideals in 
the country. Finally, the review should 
enable us to assess what the future 
holds for the newly elected Demo-
cratic Coalition for Change (dcc) 
Government.
I highlighted in the conclusion to 
the 2013 Solomon Islands review that 
there was anxiety and uncertainty 
over what 2014 had in store for the 
country (Nanau 2014). Certain events 
made 2014 seem like business as 
usual. Throughout the year, tertiary 
students from regional universities 
and local institutions continued to 
suffer from delayed allowances and 
stipends. At the University of the 
South Pacific and other Fiji-based 
tertiary institutions, students contin-
ued to be distressed by serious delays 
in their monthly stipends throughout 
the year (ssn 2014e). The same can be 
said for those studying in Papua New 
Guinea’s tertiary institutions as well as 
in the country’s own local university, 
the Solomon Islands National Uni-
versity (ssn 2014d). These students’ 
concerns highlight the fact that the 
government failed to work within 
budgetary provisions earmarked for 
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tertiary training. Part of the explana-
tion may be  attributed to political 
interference by members of Parliament 
and public officers in the selection 
and awarding of scholarships. It was 
recently reported that two officers 
of the National Training Unit (ntu) 
were suspended for giving awards 
to a group of students outside of the 
National Training Council’s approved 
list (ssn 2015a). 
Another set of practices that seemed 
to continue in 2014 was that of the 
looting and burning of businesses and 
private properties. In the aftermath of 
the devastating flash floods that struck 
Honiara and parts of north Guadal-
canal in April 2014, 21 people died 
and 30 went unaccounted for; about 
52,000 people were displaced and 
moved to shelters (Business Advantage 
PNG 2014; ssn 2014b). They were the 
first-ever flash floods that destroyed 
homes, businesses, and buildings along 
the Mataniko River. In response to 
this, humanitarian support came in 
both locally and internationally. The 
various embassies and international 
organizations such as the Australian 
and New Zealand governments, Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Red Cross Inter-
national, and Solomon Islands com-
munities residing abroad,  especially 
student communities, responded in 
cash and kind. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank (adb), for instance, 
gave us$200,000 toward the relief 
effort (ssn 2014b). Locally, church 
organizations, the Forum Solomon 
Islands International, the National 
Disaster Council, and  individual 
families contributed to alleviate the 
hardships faced by citizens who lost 
their homes and/or members of their 
families. A controversial si$15 mil-
lion was distributed to members of 
Parliament to assist their constituents, 
despite the fact that only parts of the 
country were devastated and in dire 
need of rehabilitation (One Solomon 
Islands dollar [si$] was equivalent 
to  approximately us$.13 in 2014.). 
A Solomon Islander academic, Dr 
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, noted 
that “the  Cabinet’s recent approval 
to release a total of 15 million to the 
50 mps is fishy” (sibc Online 2014c). 
Difficulties faced in the evacuation 
centers and the lack of clear messages 
coming from responsible authori-
ties regarding rehabilitation and 
resettlement led to uneasiness among 
the  displaced Honiara population. 
A  number of them refused to leave 
the evacuation centers unless they 
were assured of where they would 
be  resettled or what rehabilitation 
support they would receive. After 
weeks of confusion and frustration, 
looters and arsonists destroyed a 
shop and a football academy build-
ing in the  eastern end of Honiara in 
the King George VI school area on 
16 May 2014 (abc News 2014a). 
The Solomon Islands Police Force, 
with the assistance of ramsi, man-
aged to quell the unrest after a night 
of standoffs and criminal activities. In 
the process, the national government 
was tight-lipped and failed miserably 
to communicate with its citizens, thus 
enabling mob activity (sibc Online 
2014d). The looting and the partial 
burning and break-in at the football 
academy contributed to the defeat of 
the country’s under-19 soccer team 
that competed in Fiji a few days 
later. For a soccer-crazy country like 
Solomon Islands, this loss meant that 
both national pride and the hopes of 
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participating in the World Cup finals 
were shattered (ssn, 18 May 2014). 
These events and other negative devel-
opments seemed to continue unabated, 
as similar activities had occurred in 
2013, making citizens anxious and 
uncertain about the country’s future. 
The nationwide disapproval of the 
Darcy Lilo–led National Coalition 
for Reform and Advancement (ncra) 
government just before the 2014 elec-
tions may be attributed to its lack of 
initiative in addressing these and other 
chronic national issues. Nevertheless, 
since there were also preparations 
for a national general election taking 
place that year, hopes were pinned 
on the opportunities that may come 
with the election into office of a new 
government.
By mid-March, the registration of 
voters was already underway. In an 
effort to close the loopholes in the 
national registered voters list and 
taking into consideration experiences 
of past elections, the Solomon Islands 
Electoral Commission introduced 
changes to the voter registration 
process. One of the major changes 
was the introduction of biometric 
voter registration. This was adapted 
from the voter registration process 
used in Fiji in its first democratic elec-
tions after the 2006 coup. The same 
Canadian company, Electoral Services 
International, that provided techni-
cal expertise to the 2014 Fiji elections 
also provided Solomon Islands with 
this new biometric voter registra-
tion process. This was a change from 
the previous practice in which voter 
 registrars moved from village to 
 village in each constituency to person-
ally register eligible voters. Under the 
new system, voter registration centers 
were established and eligible voters 
traveled to these registration booths to 
register their names, have their photos 
taken, and be issued voter identifica-
tion cards (siec 2014). The hope was 
that on Election Day voters would use 
the identification cards to cast their 
ballots.
The new system proved to be very 
effective in removing ghost voters 
and people voting in more than one 
constituency. It was alleged that in 
the past, individuals could vote in a 
particular constituency in the morn-
ing and again in another constituency 
in the afternoon. There was no way 
of cross-checking and eliminating 
registered voters from double regis-
tration or, thus, double voting. The 
biometric registration removed a total 
of six thousand multiple registrations 
and ghost names from the list (ssn 
2014a). Unfortunately, there were 
certain concerns with the new system. 
The first was the difficulty for voters, 
especially the disabled and elderly, in 
traveling to registration centers to be 
registered. The previous system was 
easier because registration officers 
actually moved from house to house 
to do the registration, thereby accom-
modating the elderly and disabled. 
The second and more serious con-
cern was the practice wherein vot-
ers allegedly sold their identification 
(id) cards to would-be candidates or 
sitting members of Parliament. For 
instance, there were allegations that 
certain individuals sold their voter id 
cards to the member for Honiara for 
cash returns (ssn 2014c). The inten-
tion was that the candidate or member 
would keep the cards and on Election 
Day return the cards to the owner, 
who would then cast a ballot in favor 
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of the candidate who gave money. 
These allegations, however, were 
difficult to prove. Moreover, if it did 
happen, whether those whose cards 
were  purchased actually voted for the 
 “purchaser” is difficult to ascertain. 
Suffice it to say that the new biomet-
ric system improved the registration 
of voters and provided a better list of 
voters than in previous elections.
Apart from the biometric voter 
registration, another important 
development prior to the elections 
was the hurried passage of the Politi-
cal Parties Integrity (ppi) Bill. The 
desire to see members of Parliament 
minimize frequent floor crossing and 
to discourage independent members 
switching allegiance in Parliament had 
been evident for quite a while. For 
instance, during the reign of the Derek 
Sikua–led Solomon Islands Alliance 
for Change government from 2007 
to 2010, a similar proposal had been 
brought up for debate. A draft bill was 
then created, only to be sabotaged by 
a faction in Sikua’s own cabinet led 
by Gordon Darcy Lilo (Nanau 2010). 
Incidentally, when Lilo became prime 
minister, he pushed for the enactment 
of such legislation in the dying hours 
of his reign (sibc Online 2014f). The 
bill went through Parliament and 
became law just before the national 
elections in 2014. Two prominent pro-
visions of the ppi Act are the require-
ment for political parties to register in 
order to be officially recognized and 
for candidates to be members of a 
political party if they enter Parliament 
as independent members (National 
Parliament of Solomon Islands 2014). 
The intentions of the ppi Act are 
noble, but the members of Parliament 
who passed it were not, thus making 
it a total failure when implemented. It 
was originally a move to ensure that 
elections are credible, free, and fair. 
Solomon Islanders have long called 
for this and were excited when it was 
passed and executed (ssn, 21 May 
2014). Over the years, the quality 
of members entering Parliament has 
been far from desirable, and a few in 
the house preceding the 2014 elec-
tions were not even contributing to 
parliamentary debates. In one of his 
final contributions to the National 
Parliament, then Leader of Opposition 
Dr Derek Sikua sarcastically made 
references to such members by saying 
that he had not heard some of them 
sneeze or cough through the micro-
phones. Manasseh Sogavare, another 
member of the Opposition bench at 
the time, stressed the importance of 
amending the Electoral Act as a way 
to avoid vote buying (ssn, 22 May 
2014). The ppi Act was subsequently 
passed and came into force just in 
time to be implemented in the 2014 
national  general elections. Unfortu-
nately, the outcome of implementation 
left much to be desired. Most of those 
who debated and passed it chose not 
to abide by the provisions of the act.
The 2014 general election was seen 
as important in Solomon Islands for a 
variety of reasons. Apart from peo-
ple’s frustration with a leadership that 
has legitimized the channeling of state 
resources to itself (ie, to members of 
Parliament) under the guise of “Rural 
Constituency Development Funds” 
(see Dawea 2013), there were also 
concerns with political stability and 
gender equality in Parliament. Indeed 
the historical volatility of Parliament 
necessitated the initial drafting of the 
ppi legislation. Moreover, with a bit 
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more structure to and formalization 
of political party establishments, each 
political party would accommodate 
the need for gender equality and the 
recruitment of a “better” lot of new 
politicians. Solomon Islanders and 
the international community felt that 
a free and fair election is important 
to attain the development aspira-
tions of a developing country. The 
new voter registration system and ppi 
Act, at least to observers of Solomon 
Islands political development, have the 
potential to address the deficiencies 
witnessed in previous general elec-
tions. Likewise, the secretary-general 
of the Commonwealth, Kamalesh 
Sharma, stressed the importance of 
credible elections in shaping the type 
of society in which Solomon Island-
ers wish to live. He emphasized that 
“all concerned—the election manage-
ment body, political party leaders and 
their supporters, security agencies, 
the media, civil society and the voters 
themselves should play their rightful 
roles on election day so that the pro-
cess and results command the confi-
dence and trust of all” (sibc Online 
2014g). 
Although the voter registration 
 system solved a lot of problems with 
the registered voters list, such as repeat 
registration, ghost names, or the 
removal of names of deceased persons, 
it had some issues. The alleged selling 
of voter identification cards was also 
a concern, as was the ultimate non-
requirement of the use of id cards on 
Election Day (Transparency Solomon 
Islands 2014). The biggest concern, 
though, is the actual implementation 
of the ppi Act that was rushed through 
Parliament just before the elections 
on 19 November. This was despite 
the fact that the Opposition side of 
the house boycotted the committee 
stage of the bill, alleging that Speaker 
Allan Kemakeza was rushing through 
the clauses and shutting off questions 
from the group (sibc Online 2014e). 
A profound disappointment stemmed 
from the fact that almost 80 percent 
of sitting members of Parliament who 
were responsible for the passage of the 
ppi failed to campaign under regis-
tered political parties but ran instead 
as independents. It is mind-boggling to 
think why more than half of the then 
members agreed to the critical role 
of the ppi as such an important piece 
of legislation but went on to covertly 
protest against their own law when 
implemented. 
A total of 443 candidates contested 
the elections, a drop from 509 candi-
dates registered in the 2010 elections. 
Given the record of members of Par-
liament who legitimated the allocation 
of various funds to themselves instead 
of through the normal processes of 
government administration, it was 
hoped that many of the old members 
would be voted out. Unfortunately, 
this was not the case. Although the ppi 
Act increased the number of candi-
dates affiliated with political parties 
to 45 percent from 22 percent of 
candidates in 2010, sitting members 
had an upper hand. Indeed, 78 per-
cent of the sitting members retained 
their seats, a percentage higher than 
the post independence average of 54 
percent (Wood 2014a, 2). Part of the 
explanation for this is the discretion-
ary funding available to members of 
Parliament. For instance, in 2012 each 
member of Parliament was allocated 
si$2 million per year to deliver con-
stituency development  projects at the 
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member’s discretion (Haque 2012, 4). 
It should be noted that since 2013, 
each constituency has been allocated 
si$5,998,000 (under the 2013 devel-
opment budget); these funds cannot 
be expended for any development 
activity, even if it is administered by 
government ministries, unless the 
constituency’s member of Parliament 
affixes his or her signature to sup-
port it.
The push for gender equality under 
the ppi, and efforts by those champi-
oning the cause, fell flat on its face. 
Political parties did not seriously 
consider the critical role women play 
in national political leadership. It 
was expected that with the formaliza-
tion of political parties through legal 
requirements to register them for con-
test, more women candidates would 
secure seats through the electoral 
process. Unfortunately, this did not 
happen, as only one out of the twenty-
six women candidates secured a seat. 
Even so, Freda Soria Comua still has 
an election petition hanging over her 
head by former member of Parliament 
and Foreign Affairs Minister Clay 
Forau Soalaoi, whom she unseated. 
The first national female member, 
Hilda Kari, contested the Central 
Honiara seat but secured fewer votes 
than the other candidates in that 
constituency. The only other woman, 
Vika Lusibaea, who was a member for 
North Malaita in the previous house, 
did not contest her constituency 
because her husband, Jimmy Lusibaea, 
who was previously disqualified from 
Parliament, was eligible to contest 
the 2014 elections. She neverthe-
less contested the East Honiara seat 
but was also badly defeated. Similar 
results were noted in the 2010 elec-
tions where all female candidates who 
contested in twenty-one constituencies 
then received only 4 percent of the 
votes (McMurray 2012, 2). 
Terence Wood explained that 
the critical factors that contributed 
to the difficulty of women winning 
seats include the different standards 
of behavior that women are held to, 
lack of money to support their elec-
tion efforts, and lack of support from 
 influential brokers or local male 
figures (2014b, 1). A recent report 
by Karlyn T Roughan and Lisa Wini 
highlights three reasons why women 
did not normally get more votes, 
including people not knowing the 
candidates or their backgrounds well 
enough, not hearing their campaigns, 
and feeling that the women candi-
dates were not qualified enough to be 
elected (2015, 15–18). High Court 
Justice Stephen Pallaras also felt that 
women’s organizations ought to 
“unite in strength and fight for the 
women of this country” (sibc Online 
2014h). The history of Solomon 
Islands elections and gender equality 
efforts show that there is little hope 
for this happening under the current 
electoral system, even with a united 
front by women’s organizations. A 
more realistic call would be to work 
toward a new electoral system that 
would advance the equal representa-
tion of all Solomon Islanders, includ-
ing minority groups and women. 
The national general elections 
generated mixed expectations and 
outcomes. There was uncertainty as 
to how peaceful the elections would 
be because of previous experiences in 
2006 after the Snyder Rini–led govern-
ment was sworn in. As a contingency 
plan, about ninety-six participating 
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police officers, including riot police 
from Australia, New Zealand, Cook 
Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga, and Tuvalu were brought in 
to support the force (sibc Online 
2014a). The election was nevertheless 
peaceful except for minor incidents. 
A group of Commonwealth election 
observers headed by former PNG 
Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta 
confirmed the peaceful conclusion 
of the election (sibc Online 2014b). 
Despite the high retention rate of sit-
ting members, some longtime, promi-
nent politicians, including former 
Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo, 
were booted out. Lilo was dethroned 
by a teacher and newcomer, Jimson 
Tanangada, by more than two hun-
dred votes (abc News 2014b). The 
others were Job Dudley Tauisinga, a 
long-serving member of Parliament, 
and former Foreign Affairs Minister 
Clay Forau, who was ousted by Freda 
Soria Comua by twenty-two votes 
(ssn, 27 Nov 2014). 
Whatever one thinks or says, the 
reality is that Solomon Islands voted 
in fifty members of Parliament in 
the 2014 general election from the 
twelve registered political parties 
and independent candidates. Out of 
these elected members, 66 percent 
contested as independent candidates, 
while only 34 percent came from six 
registered political parties. The other 
six registered political parties failed 
to secure a single seat in the house. 
The results made a mockery of the 
recently enacted ppi Act aimed at 
strengthening political parties. What 
transpired from the results is the 
incredibly powerful role played by 
independent members of Parliament in 
government formation and disintegra-
tion in Solomon Islands politics (see 
Nanau 2010). Two camps emerged 
and engaged in horse-trading in the 
lead-up to the nomination and election 
of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. 
It should be noted that Sogavare was 
elected as an independent member and 
had to join a registered political party 
prior to his election as prime minister 
because of the provisions of the ppi 
Act, supported by a High Court deci-
sion in mid-November 2014 (Radio 
New Zealand 2014). 
The election of Prime Minister 
Sogavare and his dcc government 
was welcomed by many Solomon 
Islanders. Three former prime min-
isters are also in his cabinet: Derek 
Sikua, Snyder Rini, and Danny Philip. 
Sogavare also toned down his previous 
anti-Australian stance to one that is 
more conciliatory and engaging. The 
dcc government came into power with 
the baggage left by the previous Lilo–
led ncra government. One lingering 
problem was the six-month standoff 
between Solomon Islands Airlines and 
Fiji Airways (Fiji Times Online 2014). 
The dcc government took swift action 
to restore relations with Fiji by giving 
Fiji Airways the additional flight they 
requested into the country. This was 
despite the frustration expressed by 
many Solomon Islands observers and 
airline personnel about the skewed 
nature of the deal, whereby Fiji Air-
ways got what it wanted but Solomon 
Islands Airlines got nothing (see abc 
News 2015; ssn 2015b). In addition 
to this rushed decision in the airlines 
saga, Prime Minister Sogavare went 
ahead and made political appoint-
ments starting with his  special secre-
tary and thirty-nine others. The debate 
on these appointments and their 
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suitability in their positions dragged 
on into the beginning of 2015 (sibc 
Online 2015), but the dcc  maintained 
that the list of political appointees 
leaked by the social media was not 
official. However, they failed to 
submit a formal list of names of these 
appointees even after three months 
in office. 
The dcc government also released 
its policy statements in late January 
(opmc 2015), a move that was both 
welcomed and snubbed. Most of the 
policies listed and projects identified 
have been indicated in many previ-
ous government policies. Skeptics 
would like to see how different the 
dcc government will be in addressing 
these development issues. The dcc 
policy strategy to undertake serious 
fundamental reforms would hopefully 
result in national unity, stability, and 
development. The challenge now is 
to find the money to deliver services 
and ensure that some projects in this 
“development wish list” become 
realities. As 2015 progresses, the role 
of the thirty-nine political appoin-
tees (called “consultants”) is still not 
clear, and the national Opposition 
is again at the government’s throat, 
observing every move and decision 
made. Fighting corruption is said to 
be the focus of the dcc government, a 
very welcome move in a country like 
Solomon Islands. Whatever happened 
in the government, the responsibility 
of the Solomon Islands voter has been 
fulfilled with the election of represen-
tatives to Parliament. They can only 
hope that some of the Rural Con-
stituency Development Fund revealed 
earlier and development projects 
and services listed in the dcc policy 
and plan reach them in the next four 
years. The way ahead is in no way 
more clear than what it was in 2014. 
Solomon Islanders can only hope that 
the “change” indicated in the name of 
the current dcc government actually 
generates positive livelihoods for them 
and their children. 
gordon leua nanau
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Timor-Leste
For Timor-Leste, 2014 began with 
looming political uncertainty. In 
November 2013, Prime Minister 
José Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão 
announced that he intended to resign 
from office in the coming year, with 
September floated as a possible date, 
ostensibly in order to promote gen-
erational renewal of national leader-
ship. According to some accounts, 
Gusmão’s plan was to establish a 
small council of senior advisors (of 
which he would be a member) drawn 
from across the political spectrum 
that would provide direction to his 
hand-selected replacement and new 
government. But September 2014 
passed with Gusmão still in office and 
continuing to trumpet the benefits 
of major development projects while 
dismissing criticism of corruption 
within his government and passage of 
new restrictions curtailing basic rights. 
After a flurry of new rumors in early 
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2015, Prime Minister Gusmão did in 
fact tender his resignation to President 
Taur Matan Ruak on 5 February. A 
week later, the president approved 
the appointment of former Minister 
of Health Dr Rui Maria Araújo, from 
the opposition party Fretilin, as prime 
minister, and a slimmed-down new 
cabinet was announced.
The state budget is the fulcrum 
around which almost all aspects of 
politics, development, and social 
debate in Timor-Leste now revolve, so 
it is with an overview of the budget 
that any review of the previous year’s 
events must begin. The proposed 
2014 state budget totaled $1.5 bil-
lion—representing a slight decrease 
from the budget proposed for 2013 
($1.67 billion) but an increase over the 
amount actually executed the previous 
year. When the budget was ratified in 
early 2014, the breakdown by major 
category was as follows: salaries and 
wages $167 million (11.1%); goods 
and services $476 million (31.7%); 
public transfers $292 million (19.4%); 
minor capital $40 million (2.6%); 
and development capital $526 million 
(35%) (all budget figures are from 
La‘o Hamutuk 2015).
Development capital, which 
includes the infrastructure fund, 
accounted for one-third of the total 
budget. Within this category the 
largest allocation was for repair or 
construction of roads and bridges 
($90 million), including a Japanese-
supported project to improve the 
main road from Liquiçá District to the 
Indonesian border and a World Bank–
assisted project to rebuild the major 
north-south road through Ainaro 
District to the south coast. Plans for 
the development of a so-called Petro-
leum Corridor along the south coast, 
once promoted through flashy public 
presentations, wisely has been cur-
tailed, with only $52 million budgeted 
(out of a total projection of $291 
million) for the Tasi Mane supply base 
near Suai. The proposed new national 
airport in Dili and the new port facil-
ity in Tibar are still in the planning 
stages so received relatively modest 
allocations.
The most dramatic—indeed fan-
tastical—addition to the long-term 
national development plans was pas-
sage of Law 3/2014 making Oecusse 
District a special administrative 
region and the announcement that the 
enclave would be the recipient of a 
huge makeover, including the develop-
ment of a new port and airport, an 
industrial zone, and an entirely new 
planned city called the Special Zones 
of the Social Market Economy of 
Timor-Leste (known by the Tetum-
acronym zeesm). This project has 
been handed to former Fretilin Prime 
Minister Mari Alkatiri, effectively 
 buying off the only serious political 
opposition. While the long-term plan-
ning is for a joint public-private invest-
ment of $4.1 billion, the immediate 
focus is on preparation of infrastruc-
ture for the five-hundred-year anniver-
sary of the first arrival of Portuguese 
explorers later this year and the hope 
of attracting a visit by Pope Francis in 
the near future (Yoder 2015).
While much of the discussion by 
both the government and its critics 
has focused on the feasibility and 
utility of these major infrastructure 
projects, another line under “public 
transfers” in the national budget has 
quickly emerged as a mega-project of 
its own: payments to veterans. Over 
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the past several years the government 
passed legislation for veterans’ pen-
sions and cash transfers for widows 
and children of fallen veterans, at 
staggered rates depending on the num-
ber of years of service. The enacted 
2014 budget included $88 million for 
veterans, representing nearly as much 
as the already bloated expenditure on 
security. Even more revealing are the 
negotiations that took place late in the 
year over the proposed 2015 budget, 
during which it was agreed that while 
most other forms of public transfers 
(social security, housing, etc) would be 
decreased, veterans’ payments would 
be raised by 56 percent to $137 mil-
lion. This constitutes 9 percent of the 
total national budget, a figure that 
at the end of the year will inevitably 
be even higher as a percentage of the 
total executed budget. Reflecting their 
consolidation as a political bloc, veter-
ans have emerged as the most “mega” 
of the current mega-projects.
Timor-Leste is one of the most 
petroleum-dependent countries in the 
world. In 2014, an estimated 95 per-
cent of state revenue was derived from 
this sector, and 89 percent of the state 
budget was drawn from the Petroleum 
Fund. The availability of and depen-
dence on revenue from a single natural 
resource brought three issues to the 
fore in public discussions and media 
reporting during 2014.
First, despite verbal commitments 
to abide by the Estimated Sustainable 
Income (esi) of the Petroleum Fund, 
the second Gusmão-led government 
has consistently violated this core prin-
ciple. In 2014, new concerns about the 
esi emerged on two different fronts. 
Timor-Leste’s oil and gas reserves 
may not be as large as previously 
estimated. In 2013,  ConocoPhillips, 
which operates Timor-Leste’s most 
important oil and gas field (Bayu-
Undan), revised its production pro-
jections downward, estimating that 
Timor-Leste would receive nearly 50 
percent less revenue than in previous 
forecasts. Production from the Kitan 
field is due to end in 2016 and that 
from Bayu-Undan in 2020. Of equal 
concern, in 2014 global oil prices fell 
by over 40 percent, with the decline 
continuing into early 2015. Taken 
together, these two factors indicate 
that current withdrawals from the 
Petroleum Fund and financial plan-
ning are even less sustainable than the 
government originally predicted or has 
cared to admit (Scheiner 2015).
A second issue relating to the 
government’s major infrastructure 
projects concerns the geographic 
distribution of the benefits and local 
oversight. The bulk of this spending 
is seen to benefit Dili (new airport 
and port facilities as well as construc-
tion of government buildings); Suai 
district (the Supply Base and whatever 
comes of the petroleum corridor); 
and Oecusse (zeesm). Recognizing 
the need for greater local involve-
ment in the development process, 
the  government has made the first 
tentative steps to initiate decentraliza-
tion. In  October 2009, the govern-
ment  published Ministry Diploma 
7 to establish a Commission for the 
Preparation of Municipalities. But 
it was not until early 2014 that the 
Council of Ministers approved Decree 
Law 4/2014 on the Organic Statute of 
Administrative Pre-Deconcentration. 
In contrast to the plan formulated by 
the Fretilin government in 2003–04, 
which called for decentralization at 
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the  subdistrict level, the new decree 
law stipulates replacing the current 
system of districts with municipali-
ties, each of which will be headed by 
an appointed manager and an elected 
municipal assembly (Ximenes 2010). 
The new law authorizes the munici-
palities to produce an annual budget, 
an annual report, and a municipal 
development plan. However, it is not 
clear whether or when this interim 
experiment with administrative 
 deconcentration under appointed 
heads will be followed by direct 
elections or the granting of political 
authority to raise revenue.
Third, corruption cases prolifer-
ated in 2014. At least eight members 
of Gusmão’s cabinet were under 
investigation by the independent Anti-
Corruption Commission. Minister of 
Education João Câncio Freitas was 
convicted of corruption, while the 
trial of Minister of Finance Emília 
Pires, originally scheduled to begin in 
October, was postponed indefinitely 
because of political interference. 
Beyond high-ranking officials, for-
eigners working for the Timor-Leste 
government and in the private sector 
also have been involved in corrup-
tion cases. In June 2014, an Ameri-
can  lawyer named Bobby Boye, who 
worked as an advisor in the Timor-
Leste Ministry of Finance from 2010 
until 2013, was arrested by US agents 
and charged with wire fraud and 
using his influence to have the minis-
try pay $3.5 million into an account 
of a fictitious company. In another 
case, a  Portuguese businessman from 
Macau who worked in the telecom-
munications sector was imprisoned 
without trial on charges of transfer-
ring $800,000 to his wife’s account 
in Macau, and his family’s passports 
were confiscated.
While charges of corruption are not 
new in Timor-Leste, the proliferation 
of such cases in 2014 led opposition 
figures, journalists, and civil society 
organizations to charge that Prime 
Minister Gusmão was actively pro-
tecting corrupt officials within his 
government (Allard 2014). On 22 
October, Gusmão submitted an official 
request to the National Parliament 
asking that members of government 
remain immune from prosecution until 
after the 2017 election, but Parlia-
ment turned down the request. On 
the  anniversary of the 1999 Popular 
Consultation on independence from 
Indonesian rule, President Taur Matan 
Ruak granted a pardon to five prison-
ers, among whom was former  Minister 
of Justice Lúcia Maria Lobato, who 
had been convicted of corruption 
and  sentenced to a five-year prison 
term. (This was not the first instance 
of a controversial pardon. In 2008 
President José Ramos Horta granted 
a  pardon to former Minister of the 
 Interior Rogerio Lobato, who had 
been found guilty of manslaughter 
and the distribution of weapons to 
 civilians.)
The ballooning of the state budget 
over the past several years has enabled 
the government to effectively buy off 
most parliamentary opposition. The 
centerpiece of this strategy in 2014 
was the accommodation reached 
between Prime Minister Gusmão and 
his onetime foe, Fretilin leader Mari 
Alkatiri, and the agreement to hand 
management of the Oecusse Special 
Administrative and Economic Zone to 
Alkatiri. This political accommodation 
was sealed in late 2014 when Gusmão 
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publicly stated that he had been 
wrong to rely on Australian sources 
with regard to then-Prime Minister 
Alkatiri’s involvement in the arms 
scandal that provided the immediate 
trigger for the outbreak of violence 
in 2006—which had paved the way 
for Gusmão’s own ascension to the 
position of prime minister. Mean-
while, the generous veterans’ benefits 
initiated over the past few years have 
made  former members of the resis-
tance, regardless of party affiliation, 
an increasingly confident pro-Gusmão 
bloc within Parliament and one that 
is backed by a wide and influential 
constituency throughout all thirteen 
districts.
In the absence of meaningful 
democratic opposition in Parliament, 
the locus of opposition has shifted 
outward to the districts. The longest-
standing focal point for criticism now 
resides with the Popular Democratic 
Council of the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste (cpd-rdtl), 
an organization that in 1999 claimed 
to stand for the 1975 constitution 
and therefore opposed the United 
Nations interim administration and 
the continued international presence 
in the country. Although the behavior 
and statements made by cpd-rdtl 
leaders are often erratic, grassroots 
support for the group’s ideals has not 
only persisted but spread during the 
past year. The organization appears to 
have greatest support in Baucau and 
Bobonaro districts but has also been 
active in Manufahi, Covalima, and 
elsewhere.
Expressions of opposition to the 
government intensified in late 2013 
when a former resistance commander 
named Paulino “Mauk Moruk” 
Gama returned to Timor-Leste from 
the Netherlands, where he had lived 
for nearly thirty years. In 1984, 
Mauk Moruk had been involved 
in a struggle over leadership of the 
resistance but came out on the los-
ing end and surrendered, eventually 
making his way into exile. Soon after 
his return to Timor-Leste, Mauk 
Moruk declared the establishment of 
the Maubere  Revolutionary Council 
(crm) and called for the resignation 
of the government and a return to the 
1975 constitution. Supporters in his 
home region of Laga, wearing military 
uniforms, carried out public demon-
strations. In response to the perceived 
threat, on 3 March 2014 Parliament 
issued Resolution 15/2014, stating 
that Mauk Moruk’s crm and cpd-
rdtl violated the constitution, the 
penal code, and Decree Law 7/2014. 
Both organizations were thereby 
declared illegal. Leaders of crm and 
cpd-rdtl quickly rejected the par-
liamentary resolution and the accusa-
tions that they were armed and had 
misused military uniforms (Marisa 
Gonçalves 2014).
The March parliamentary resolu-
tion provided legal grounds for the 
National Police of Timor-Leste (pntl) 
to begin conducting operations against 
both crm and cpd-rdtl. Arrests 
commenced at the cpd-rdtl head 
office in Balide, Dili, where nineteen 
members were detained. In Laga, 
pntl personnel lowered the flags at 
the crm base at Lalulai and detained 
two people, but other supporters 
evaded arrest. (National police had 
also arrested members of the Bua 
Malus group, which is led by Labarik 
Maia, in Buruma, Baucau, in Decem-
ber 2013.) On 13 March, the pntl 
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arrested Mauk Moruk at the crm 
headquarters in Fatuhada, Dili. Mauk 
Moruk, his brother Cornelio “L-7” 
Gama, and the Bua Malus leader 
Labarik Maia were then brought to 
court for pretrial proceedings. All 
three were detained in Becora prison 
while awaiting trial. In response 
to a police order for all crm and 
cpd-rdtl members to report to the 
 security forces, some supporters of 
these groups are reported to have gone 
into hiding.
The most important issue regard-
ing rights in 2014 involved a new 
Media Law significantly curtailing 
the freedom of journalists (including 
fines for violating the law), regulating 
media ownership, and requiring for-
eign journalists who wish to operate 
within the country to obtain official 
permits. During the first half of 2014, 
Parliament debated a draft of the law, 
which, despite widespread objections 
from civil society, was approved on 
6 May 2014 and then submitted to 
the president of the republic. Rather 
than using his prerogative right to 
approve or veto the law, President 
Taur Matan Ruak asked the Court of 
Appeal to examine it. After delibera-
tion, the Court of Appeal returned 
the draft law to the National Parlia-
ment for improvement and advised 
that the draft law must be compatible 
with the constitution. On 16 Decem-
ber, the Court of Appeal declared the 
Media Law to be unconstitutional. 
In response, Vice President of Parlia-
ment Adriano Nascimento rejected the 
court decision on grounds that it was 
issued by an international judge who 
was subsequently expelled from the 
country. 
Passage of the new Media Law 
stimulated widespread outcry from 
human rights organizations, journal-
ists, and civil society in the country 
and received considerable interna-
tional media coverage. Human Rights 
Watch expressed concern about the 
requirement that all journalists must 
obtain licenses, the establishment 
of a five-member press council, and 
the unclear definitions of “national 
culture” and “public interest.” Civil 
society groups argued that the stipula-
tion that all journalists must obtain 
a license and the definition of jour-
nalistic activities would adversely 
affect civil society, freelance writers, 
bloggers, and other commentators. 
Others agreed that the law would 
prevent the media from reporting on 
corruption and other cases involving 
public officials. In an interview with 
The Economist, José Antonio Belo, 
the president of the Timor-Leste Press 
Union, publicly stated that he would 
not register as a journalist and was 
ready to pay any fines imposed and 
even go to prison (Economist 11 Sept 
2014).
A second critical issue relating to 
the law emerged in October 2014 
when Parliament, acting at the request 
of Prime Minister Gusmão, secretly 
passed a resolution calling for an 
audit of the judicial system and the 
immediate dismissal of all foreigners 
working in the judicial sector, includ-
ing foreign judges, prosecutors, public 
defenders, and judicial advisors. On 
the same day, the government issued 
a resolution terminating the contracts 
of foreign judicial workers on grounds 
of national interest. In late October, 
the president of the Court of Appeal 
stated that the resolution violated the 
principle of separation of powers and 
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called on all foreign judicial workers 
to return to their functions. Never-
theless, the government ordered the 
Immigration Department to immedi-
ately revoke the working visas of eight 
foreign judges and prosecutors and 
insisted that they leave the coun-
try within two days (Leach 2014). 
Several of the judges whose contracts 
were terminated were due to hear 
corruption cases involving govern-
ment officials, the current Speaker of 
the National Parliament, and police 
personnel, reinforcing the perception 
that the prime minister was acting to 
protect cabinet members charged with 
corrupt practices.
This government decision prompted 
outrage domestically and sharp con-
demnation from international human 
rights organizations. Amnesty Inter-
national issued a statement expressing 
concern that the sudden departure of 
the foreign judicial workers would 
delay access to justice for victims, 
particularly women and children who 
have experienced domestic violence, 
and would adversely affect trial dates 
for those in prison (Amnesty Inter-
national 2014). What impact this 
decision will have on access to the law 
and judicial independence is one of the 
great unknowns going into 2015.
Government officials have taken 
great pride in the fact that economic 
growth has exceeded 7 percent for the 
last few years and continue to promise 
that investment in major development 
projects will bring long-term ben-
efits. While there is a desperate need 
to improve basic infrastructure, the 
much-heralded South Coast Petroleum 
Corridor is now on hold and the pro-
jected spending on the Oecusse Special 
Zone is unlikely to succeed. These 
mega-projects and profligate budget-
ing for veterans are diverting resources 
and attention from the pressing issues 
of domestic food security, accessible 
health care, and job creation. For 
these reasons, in the coming year the 
newly installed government led by 
Prime Minister Rui Maria Araújo is 
likely to face increased friction around 
questions of budgeting, corruption, 
and internal security, as well as diffi-
culties holding the patchwork cross-
party government together.
douglas kammen
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Vanuatu
In many ways, 2014 in Vanuatu was 
much like any other year: periods 
of political instability with rumored 
votes of no confidence, one leading 
to a change of government; accusa-
tions of fraud and corruption; and 
court challenges. At the same time, 
there were periods of relative calm and 
moments of proud achievement with 
the introduction of a new system to 
elect municipal councils that guaran-
tees women a third of the seats and 
the smooth election of Vanuatu’s 
eighth president, and celebration when 
Vanuatu was finally connected to the 
Southern Cross undersea cable, pro-
viding a new level of communication 
to the rest of the world.
Compared to previous years, the 
population of Port Vila woke up a bit 
earlier in 2014 after the usual quiet 
Christmas/New Year holiday period, 
due to the election of a new Muni-
cipal Council, scheduled for 7 Janu-
ary. The vote was significant, since it 
was to be based on an amendment to 
the Municipalities Act (Municipali-
ties [Amendment] Act 11 of 2013), 
approved by Parliament the previ-
ous year, which guaranteed that 30 
to 34 percent of municipal council 
seats were to be reserved for women 
(Van Trease 2014, 545). The new law 
applies to the two existing municipal 
councils in Vanuatu—Port Vila and 
Luganville—and any future municipal 
councils that might be established. The 
procedure subsequently approved by 
the Council of Ministers allows voters 
in each municipal ward (five in Port 
Vila, for a total of seventeen seats) two 
votes—one for a general list consisting 
of both male and female candidates 
and a second for a list reserved for 
female candidates only. 
While interest seemed high, voter 
turnout was low, common for munici-
pal elections in Vanuatu, with only 35 
percent of the 28,691 registered voters 
casting their ballots. The counting of 
votes for the general seats is based on 
a system of proportional representa-
tion reflecting the number of candi-
dates fielded by the different parties, 
while the seats reserved for women 
are determined by first past the post—
one seat for each of the five wards. 
The results reflected those of the Port 
Vila constituency in the 2012 general 
election, when the parties then in 
Opposition—now the current govern-
ment—dominated. The Vanua‘aku 
Pati (vp) won 5 seats, Green Confed-
eration 5, Union of Moderate Parties 
(ump) 4, Graon mo Jastis Pati (gjp) 2, 
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and there was one independent (vdp, 
18 Jan 2014; Republic of Vanuatu, 
Official Gazette).
The ump, vp, and gjp signed a 
memorandum of understanding to run 
the Municipal Council (vdp, 20 Jan 
2014). One of the ump councilors, 
Ulrich Sumptoh, defeated a Green can-
didate for the position of mayor. This 
was not surprising given the failure of 
the Greens (led by then Prime Minister 
and Member of Parliament [mp] for 
Port Vila Moana Carcasses) to follow 
through on a preelection agreement 
whereby the gjp would forgo running 
candidates for the general seats in the 
southern ward in return for the Greens 
not running a candidate for the wom-
an’s reserved seat. The Greens, in fact, 
ran an independent candidate on the 
general list, who won the seat, costing 
the gjp an expected victory (Repub-
lic of Vanuatu, Official Results). The 
failure of the Green Confederation 
to honor this agreement with gjp on 
municipal-level politics had a carry-
over effect nationally. It signaled the 
perception that the leaders of these 
two parties were no longer as close as 
they once appeared to be.
There was no evidence of any reluc-
tance to accept the new voting system, 
and therefore, for the first time in 
Vanuatu’s electoral history, thousands 
of both men and women voted for and 
elected multiple female candidates to 
political office. It should be noted that 
women do not use their numerical 
power to unite in support of female 
candidates but rather seem to follow 
the men in their families. As a result, 
since independence, only five women 
have been elected to Parliament and 
a similar number to the municipal 
councils of Port Vila and Luganville. 
The election was indeed revolutionary 
in Vanuatu’s electoral history and a 
first among Pacific Island countries as 
a whole. 
Except for the National United 
Party (nup), the Opposition did not 
get involved in the municipal elec-
tion, but it had not gone to sleep. 
By mid-February, rumors began to 
surface of an impending motion of 
no confidence against the Carcasses 
government (vdp, 17 Feb 2014). The 
last such motion had occurred in July 
2013—tabled by the then leader of 
the  Opposition, Ham Lini—but was 
dismissed on technical grounds relat-
ing to the validity of signatures (Van 
Trease 2014, 548). With a reported 
27 out of 52 mps having signed the 
motion for an extraordinary session to 
be convened, the government appeared 
to be under threat with only 24 mps 
on its side (vdp, 18 Feb 2014). (Note 
that the Speaker, who is an elected mp, 
does not vote unless there is a tie or in 
the case of the actual election of prime 
minister.)
Up to this time, government sup-
port had been quite solid with a total 
of 36 mps out of 52, comprising basi-
cally two blocs—the Carcasses group 
and a group led by Edward Natapei, 
deputy prime minister and leader of 
the Vanua‘aku Pati. In addition to the 
vp, the Natapei group consisted of 
mps from the gjp, ump, and Mela-
nesian Progressive Party (mpp), none 
of whom, it was reported in a press 
release, had signed the motion of no 
confidence. 
The problem for the government 
arose when 11 mps who had been 
part of the Carcasses group switched 
sides and formally reconciled with 
the Opposition. Included were mem-
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bers representing the Iauko Group, 
Nagriamel, Natatok, and the Vanu-
atu Republican Party, as well as an 
independent. The Opposition at that 
point had comprised 16 members 
and was led by Ham Lini, leader of 
the National United Party, as well as 
mps from the People’s Progressive 
Party, Reunification of Movement for 
Change, Vanuatu Liberal Democratic 
Party, and an independent. 
It was reported that the eleven 
disaffected mps had decided to move 
against the government because 
 Carcasses had failed to follow through 
on undertakings he made the previous 
year. He had not supported a prom-
ised increase of mp allocations from 
4 million vatu to 10 million (us$1.00 
averaged around 96.8 vatu [vt] in 
2014), given to mps to fund projects 
in their own constituencies, which 
he later denied, and had not fairly 
 distributed roofing iron given by the 
Chinese government to Carcasses’s 
Green Confederation (vdp, 26 Feb 
2014). 
Realizing they did not have the 
numbers to survive a no-confidence 
vote, the government boycotted the 
extraordinary session of Parliament 
that was scheduled for 24 February. 
At a press conference on the same 
day, Prime Minister Carcasses made 
an offer of four ministerial portfo-
lios to members of the Opposition 
bloc, which was initially rejected but 
accepted a few days later, returning 
the government to a majority of 28 
with the Opposition at 23. Realizing 
they no longer had the numbers, the 
Opposition withdrew the motion of 
no confidence (vdp, 27 Feb 2014). A 
total of nine political parties remained 
united in opposition: the National 
United Party, Reunification of Move-
ment for Change, Vanuatu Republi-
can Party, Vanuatu Progressive Party, 
Nagriamel, People’s Progressive Party, 
Iauko Group, Hope, and Natatok 
(vdp, 3 March 2014).
Rumors of yet another move 
against the government became reality 
when a motion of no confidence was 
tabled during the second week of May, 
lodged by the leader of the Opposi-
tion, Ham Lini, and the deputy leader 
of the Opposition, Sato Kilman. It 
was signed by thirteen mps, all from 
the Opposition, and was scheduled 
for debate on the afternoon of 15 
May. Six reasons were given for the 
motion, which accused the prime 
minister of reckless financial policies 
“with the potential to destroy the 
country’s  foreign reserves and import 
cover in the near future . . . [that he] 
is gambling the future of the country 
on questionable schemes . . . without 
the required due diligence,” such as 
the ciip scheme [Capital Investment 
Immigration Plan, designed to sell 
permanent residence visas to wealthy 
Chinese], real estate deals and the 
proposed international airport. He 
was also accused of allowing the 
 “deterioration of the health services 
throughout the rural areas” and of 
becoming  “dictatorial” toward key 
government institutions and “inter-
fering with the Public Service Com-
mission to promote his political 
 supporters” (vdp, 10 May 2014).
In a press conference on the day 
before the impending vote,  Carcasses 
rejected all the allegations leveled 
against him, and Deputy Prime 
Minister Edward Natapei attempted 
to assuage rumors that his own 
Vanua‘aku Pati was backing the 
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motion. Natapei pledged his sup-
port and that of the bloc of parties he 
headed, totaling 18 mps out of the 35 
who made up the coalition—the vp, 
gjp, and ump—and confirmed that he 
had not received any indication from 
the other two parties that they were 
contemplating a move in support of 
the Opposition’s motion. Furthermore, 
he assured the prime minister that he 
would inform him, as required under 
the coalition agreement, if he heard 
anything. When quizzed by a reporter 
“if he would be the sole vp mp stick-
ing with the pm while all the other 
vp mps would be moving to  support 
the motion,” he made the point that 
“it is important for the future and the 
solidarity of the party [vp] for all of us 
to remain with the Government” (vdp, 
15 May 2014). 
Nevertheless, when the motion was 
voted on the following day, 35 mps, 
including those from the vp and the 
gjp, joined the opposition to remove 
Carcasses. He was replaced by vet-
eran vp politician Joe Natuman from 
the island of Tanna, who was the 
sole nominee and who received an 
unprecedented 40 votes out of the 
total of 52 mps, with 9 voting against 
and 3 abstaining. More mps voted for 
 Natuman than had crossed the floor 
to vote to censure Carcasses. 
There were reports that the move 
against Carcasses stemmed from his 
successful attempt at removing Nata-
pei as prime minister in 2010 and that 
Natapei had been aware of the plot 
all along. While there may be an ele-
ment of truth in the “revenge” theory, 
growing concern over a number of the 
prime minister’s policies as outlined 
in the motion—but, in particular, his 
promotion since 2013 of a us$350 
million guarantee for the construc-
tion of a new airport by a Singapore 
company best known for tobacco 
production—appears to be the most 
compelling reason uniting the 35 
mps from the Opposition and within 
the government coalition to vote to 
replace Carsasses (Van Trease 2014, 
549–550). 
Carcasses himself would have 
been surprised by the outcome of the 
motion, since those plotting against 
him did not have to reveal the full 
degree of their support until the actual 
day of the debate. They only needed 
nine signatures to table a motion of 
no confidence, since Parliament was 
in session (Parliamentary Standing 
Orders, Para 14 [1]). If Parliament 
is not in session, a motion presented 
to the Speaker must be accompanied 
by a request to call an extraordinary 
session, which requires the support 
of a majority of mps, or 27 signa-
tures. Since the motion in May was 
tabled during an ordinary session 
of Parliament, there was no need to 
recall Parliament and, therefore, no 
need to demonstrate support beyond 
the required 9 mps who signed the 
motion, though 13 actually signed. 
Carcasses, therefore, seems to have 
been unaware of the substantial back-
ing for the motion and would have 
been moderately confident of surviving 
the no-confidence vote, having been 
assured by Natapei of the support of 
the largest party grouping in his gov-
erning coalition. It was reported that 
on the day the motion was debated, 
the vp and gjp symbolically “crossed 
the floor”—accompanied by Deputy 
Speaker Edward Natapei—to join 
with the Opposition to bring him 
down. This brought to an early end 
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the one-year leadership of the nation 
by Carcasses, whose accession to 
the position, as the first naturalized 
citizen to do so, was controversial. He 
may now be a spent force in Vanuatu 
national politics. 
The new government moved 
quickly to demonstrate a new course. 
Prime Minister Natuman aligned him-
self and his new government with the 
“core values” of the founding fathers 
of the country—“honesty, respect, 
transparent and accountable, and 
proper” management of government 
“not to live beyond your means” (vdp, 
22 May 2014). The prime minister 
also announced that portfolios would 
not be offered to mps who perpetually 
crossed the floor in Parliament and 
contributed to ongoing political insta-
bility. Members of the Iauko Group, 
in particular, were mentioned. At the 
same time, the government gave notice 
that it intended to introduce a leader-
ship integrity bill to ban mps from 
crossing the floor in Parliament (vdp, 
21 May 2014). As a result of these 
decisions, it soon became clear that 
the government would not be able to 
sustain the very large degree of parlia-
mentary support it had enjoyed in the 
vote of no confidence and election of 
Natuman as prime minister. However, 
while rumors of votes of no confi-
dence surfaced almost immediately, 
the government was never seriously 
threatened for the rest of the year. 
Just one week after Natuman took 
over as prime minister, his position 
was strengthened beyond doubt when 
the Supreme Court announced that it 
had dismissed election petition case 3, 
relating back to the national election 
in 2012, involving all seven seats in 
the prime minister’s home constitu-
ency of Tanna. The election had been 
challenged on broad grounds relating 
to the use of unauthorized envelopes 
for casting votes, proxy voting, and 
allegations of bribery. The petition 
was one of twenty-four lodged after 
the election, all of which were ulti-
mately dismissed. In the Tanna case, 
the Supreme Court found that the 
petitioners had failed to establish 
grounds for overturning the election 
results, thus eliminating any doubt as 
to Natuman’s position and authority 
(vdp, 24 May 2014). The inordinate 
delay in resolving the election petitions 
brought to light a weakness in the 
overall voting system, which needs to 
be resolved in the future. 
The two coalitions of parties that 
emerged to form the new government 
and the Opposition revealed what 
may become an increasingly important 
trend in Vanuatu politics—the attempt 
to reconstitute the old party group-
ings from the time of independence. 
During the 1980s, Vanuatu politics 
was dominated by just two parties: the 
 Vanua‘aku Pati, which held govern-
ment throughout the decade, and the 
Union of Moderate Parties. However, 
both parties eventually splintered due 
to internal leadership rivalries. 
In 1987, following a failed attempt 
to unseat Father Walter Lini as presi-
dent, Barak Sope left the vp and set 
up his own Melanesian Progressive 
Party (mpp). The most significant 
split occurred in 1991, when Lini 
was forced out of the vp in a power 
struggle and established his own 
National United Party (nup), led 
today by his brother Ham Lini. Sato 
Kilman broke away from the mpp in 
2001 and established the People’s Pro-
gressive Party (ppp). Having divided 
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their followers, neither the vp nor 
nup was able to win a majority in the 
1991 national election, allowing the 
Union of Moderate parties (ump), led 
by Maxime Carlot Korman, to form a 
coalition with nup—a chance for Lini 
to get revenge on his former vp allies 
who had maneuvered his demise (Van 
Trease 1995, 73–163). Within a few 
years, however, the ump also began to 
have leadership problems. By 1995, 
Serge Vohor had forced Korman out 
of the ump, the latter establishing 
his own Vanuatu Republican Party 
(vrp), and in 2012 Charlot Salwai 
broke away and established what he 
now calls Reunification of Move-
ment for Change (rmc). Not long 
after, Korman lost control of the vrp 
and formed the Vanuatu Democratic 
Party, and his nephew, Alfred Carlot, 
 reconstituted the Natatok Party (Van 
Trease 2014, 531–532). 
Earlier in 2014, the leaders of both 
the vp and the ump announced their 
intention to attempt to reconcile the 
breakaway political groups from their 
respective parties. ump organized a 
meeting of “Moderates” in Lugan-
ville, where then Minister Serge Vohor 
(leader of the ump) correctly argued 
that the total number of votes for 
moderate candidates was not reflected 
in the number of mps elected. Those 
invited to the meeting included Prime 
Minister Moana Carcasses (Green 
Confederation), Vincent Boulekone 
(former Tan Union), mps Stephen 
Kalsakau and Charlot Salwai (Reuni-
fication of Movement for Change), 
mp Paul Telukluk (Namaki Aute), 
mp Willie Jimmy (Liberal Democratic 
Party), Nagriamel leaders, and mod-
erate leaders from Tanna (eg, John 
Frum, Kapiel). Salwai, claiming to also 
speak on behalf of Nagriamel, John 
Frum, and Kapiel, rejected the ump 
call for unity (vdp, 4 Feb, 6 Feb 2014). 
It should be noted that Salwai joined 
with the vp, nup, and gjp to topple 
Carcasses, who with Vohor (ump) 
formed the new Opposition in May. 
The Vanua‘aku Pati, which has 
recently been identified as representing 
the “Nationalists”—harkening back 
to its role as leader of the group that 
led the struggle for independence—has 
announced its intention to reconcile 
with its former political allies but has 
not found the process any easier to 
achieve than that of the ump. While 
informal discussions have been under-
way for some time with Ham Lini and 
nup, and with Barak Sope’s mpp, the 
outcome of vp’s 38th party congress 
in August demonstrated that politi-
cal rivalries among top leaders—both 
within and breakaway—were far from 
being resolved.
Particularly difficult were rela-
tions with the Iauko Group, headed 
by Pascal Iauko (son of vp break-
away Harry Iauko from the island of 
Tanna), whose quest for leadership 
at the  Tongoa congress in 2010 split 
the party, leaving Edward Natapei as 
president. Iauko was forced eventu-
ally to adopt the name “Iauko Group” 
in order to contest the 2012 election, 
in which he was returned as mp for 
Tanna (Van Trease 2014, 532). The 
fact that Harry Iauko had been one 
of Nata pei’s strongest supporters 
in 1999, when he was elected party 
president (see below), demonstrates 
how fickle big party politics can be 
in Vanuatu. Following Iauko’s death 
under mysterious circumstances in 
December 2012 in Santo—suspected 
to be linked to the presence of the 
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mega yacht  Phocea, which was 
anchored in Port Vila harbor for ten 
months during 2012 and 2013—his 
son, Pascal Sebastien Iauko, won a 
by-election in May 2013 to replace his 
father (Van Trease 2014, 547). 
Election of the party executive 
turned out to be the most divisive 
problem facing the vp at the August 
2014 congress. Traditionally, though 
it is not specifically stated in the party 
by-laws, the senior leadership role 
(president of the party) should hold 
the senior position in Parliament—
that is, prime minister or leader of 
the Opposition—should the possibil-
ity present itself. This fundamental 
issue, however, has never been fully 
addressed and has led to tension 
between rival leaders on at least one 
other occasion. In 1999, the newly 
elected party president, Edward Nata-
pei, stepped aside to allow mp Donald 
Kalpokas to take the leading role as 
prime minister. Within two years, 
rivalry between the two men and their 
supporters had developed to the point 
that in a snap election in 2002, Kalpo-
kas was forced to run as part of a 
separate vp faction, called the Vanua-
K Group, and lost the election when 
opposition vp—Natapei supporters—
ran rival candidates in his constituency 
of Efate. Natapei, therefore, continued 
as president of the party. 
When the 2014 congress convened 
in Port Vila, the vp again faced the 
 situation of two strong leaders vying 
for the top party position—both 
 Natuman and Natapei were nomi-
nated for the position of president—
creating tension among the delegates. 
At one point, balloting was suspended 
for a time and some votes were 
declared invalid. In the end, Natapei 
was elected president of the Vanua‘aku 
Pati, while Natuman retained his posi-
tion as vice president and, of course, 
prime minister of the republic. Both 
men assured the congress that they 
would respect the outcome (vdp, 26 
Aug, 28 Aug, 29 Aug 2014). 
The day prior to the start of the 
congress, the four “nationalist parties” 
(the vp, nup, mpp, and ppp) signed an 
agreement that they hoped would lead 
to their reunification (vdp, 25 Aug 
2014). It is significant to note that 
the Iauko Group was not included in 
the signing, despite the fact that they 
had helped topple Carcasses in May 
and had formally reconciled with 
the vp in a ceremony in June (vdp, 
25 June 2014). This was most likely 
due to lingering discontent from the 
fact that the Iauko Group had not 
been included in the distribution of 
portfolios following the ouster of 
the Carcasses government, making 
a permanent reconciliation difficult. 
The outcome of the congress clearly 
indicates that the vp still has work to 
do to produce a functioning party that 
reunites all its breakaway parts. 
Making the issue more problem-
atic is the fact that over the years, but 
particularly since 1991, increasing 
numbers of independents have been 
elected—some taking on party names 
and others remaining as independents. 
They usually disappear after one elec-
tion, but an exception has been the 
Graon mo Jastis Pati, led by Ralph 
Regenvanu, who was first elected in 
2008 as an independent and, after 
the foundation of his own party in 
2010, succeeded in getting four mps 
elected (including himself) in the 
2012 election. He is known for taking 
principled positions based on issues 
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of good governance and has served in 
the Kilman, Carcasses, and, at present, 
Natuman governments. Regenvanu 
has become very influential in politics 
today, having spearheaded significant 
reform legislation as minister of lands 
in 2013 and emerging as a driving 
force in the toppling of the Carcasses 
government in May. His style of 
politics has begun to attract consider-
able support, and not only in his own 
electorate of Port Vila, where in the 
2012 election he received the high-
est total vote ever by a candidate in 
 Vanuatu’s electoral history. The issue 
worth watching is whether Vanuatu 
voters will be attracted to the call of 
the old parties to reunite on the basis 
of past history or turn to the likes of 
the new Graon mo Jastis Pati, which 
focuses much more clearly on dealing 
with the challenges of today.
Indeed, one wonders if the two 
groups—Nationalists and Moder-
ates—are really serious about reviving 
past glories as the basis for modern 
parties today, especially since an 
increasing majority of voters were not 
even born at the time of independence 
in 1980 and would not be aware of 
the events, let alone the policies of the 
two major parties. It is never dis-
cussed, but the Moderates and Nation-
alists reflect the old Anglo/French 
divide, which made the achievement of 
independence for Vanuatu extremely 
difficult. Will the two sides want to 
debate each other again over the old 
issue of the need for immediate or 
delayed independence? Do they really 
want to fight over which systems of 
education, local  government, or law 
are better, or which language is more 
important—English or French? And, 
of course, there is the rebellion. On 
which side do the party groupings 
stand today? The astounding thing 
is that these issues are hardly ever 
spoken about—they are taboo sub-
jects, which everyone seems to want to 
forget—and yet they lie just below the 
surface and silently affect relationships 
far more than the two groups are will-
ing to admit to themselves, let alone 
to each other. The desire to reduce 
instability is an admirable goal, and 
the leaders of the old parties should be 
praised for focusing on the problem. 
Knowing and acknowledging one’s 
history is essential for understand-
ing the present, but as the old saying 
goes: “You can’t move forward by just 
 staring in the rearview mirror!” 
Perhaps sensing the opportune 
moment, on 29 August, the Carcasses-
led opposition tabled a new motion 
of no confidence and request to call 
Parliament into session, signed by 27 
mps, with the backing of some gov-
ernment backbenchers (vdp, 30 Aug 
2014). Subsequently, the Speaker ruled 
that the motion was not in order due 
to the fact that several of the govern-
ment backbenchers claimed they had 
withdrawn their signatures prior to or 
after the motion was actually tabled 
(vdp, 1 Sept, 2 Sept 2014). The dispute 
finally ended up in court, confirming 
the Speaker’s decision to reject the 
motion (vdp, 9 Sept 2014).
In the midst of this unsettled politi-
cal situation, Parliament turned to 
the important task of electing a new 
president to replace His Excellency 
President Iolu Johnson Abbil, whose 
five-year term in office was about to 
expire. It was obvious to most politi-
cal leaders that this would be a diffi-
cult task, as Parliament was narrowly 
divided, making it highly unlikely that 
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either side of politics—the National-
ists or the Moderates—would have 
the numbers to elect one of their own 
candidates without support from 
another party. 
According to the Vanuatu Constitu-
tion, “the election of the President of 
the Republic shall take place within 
3 weeks of the end of the term of 
office of the previous President. . . .
any indigenous Vanuatu citizen quali-
fied to be elected to Parliament shall 
be eligible for election as President of 
the Republic” (Constitution, chapter 
6, article 34, schedule 1 and article 
35). Following on, “every citizen of 
Vanuatu who is at least 25 years of 
age shall be eligible to stand for elec-
tion to Parliament” (Constitution, 
chapter 4, article 17 [2]). In other 
words, the office of president is open 
only to “indigenous” citizens of at 
least twenty-five years of age.
The president is elected by a two-
thirds majority of a 58-seat Electoral 
College—39 votes—consisting of 
the 52 mps plus the presidents of the 
6 provincial governments. At the time, 
the government controlled only two of 
the provinces (Malampa and Penama) 
and the Opposition four (Banks/ Torres, 
Sanma, Shefa and Tafea), which gave 
the government an estimated 32 votes 
and the opposition 26; it is difficult to 
be more precise because of the waver-
ing support of certain mps. 
A total of 23 individuals expressed 
to the Electoral Office their intention 
to apply for the vacant position. Two 
were women, but they did not pro-
ceed to fill out the forms. Likewise, 
several of the remaining men did not 
submit completed forms, leaving only 
13 names, which were duly screened 
by the Electoral Office; all of them 
were approved and submitted to the 
Electoral College for consideration. 
The 13 candidates included mostly 
former politicians: two prime minis-
ters (Barak Tame Sope and Maxime 
Carlot Korman), several ministers and 
elected mps, a clerk to Parliament, and 
one clergyman. Six of the candidates 
would have been identified with the 
government side, while four were 
associated with the Opposition. The 
remaining three had not been actively 
involved in politics (vdp, 10 Sept, 15 
Sept 2014). 
While experience, reputation, and 
political affiliation are important 
considerations, island of origin was 
also clearly a factor in the selec-
tion process. Of the seven previous 
presidents, one was from Efate and 
one from Emae (Shefa Province); 
one from Aneityum and one from 
Tanna (Tafea Province); one from 
Pentecost (Penama Province); and 
one from Ambrym (Malampa Prov-
ince). It was suggested in the press 
that the new president would most 
likely come from one of the islands 
or provinces that had yet to produce 
a head of state, and this was reflected 
in the number of candidates who 
had applied: the islands of Malakula 
(4), Santo (3), Torba (1), and Ambae 
(1). There were no candidates from 
Tafea Province, which had already 
produced two presidents, includ-
ing the current president, Iolu Abbil, 
from the island of Tanna. One local 
journalist described how the National-
ists (the government coalition) were 
keen that someone be elected who 
had been associated with the inde-
pendence struggle. The Opposition 
moderates were thought to be focus-
ing on someone from the Nagriamel 
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 movement, which was on the other 
side of  independence politics (vdp, 
17 Sept 2014).
The Electoral College convened 
on 16 September with Chief Justice 
Vincent Lunabek presiding. Not 
surprising, given the political atmo-
sphere at the time, reaching a decision 
was extremely difficult. The Elec-
toral College had to meet on seven 
separate days before one candidate 
received the required two-thirds of 
the votes. Baldwin Jackson Lonsdale, 
from the island of Motalava in the 
Banks Islands (Torba Province), was 
elected with 46 votes—7 more than 
the minimum 39 required under the 
constitution. His election was surpris-
ing for some, as he was one of the 
least political of the candidates, but 
this may actually explain his election, 
given the political divisions at the 
time. He began employment in 1968, 
before independence, working as an 
officer in the British National Service, 
and he had subsequently trained to 
become an Anglican priest, attaining 
tertiary level qualifications in New 
Zealand. He later taught at several 
different  educational institutions and 
served as the secretary-general of 
Torba  Province from 1998 to 2006 
(vdp, 23 Sept 2014). 
In mid-July, students at the Emalus 
Campus of the University of the South 
Pacific in Port Vila staged a peace-
ful demonstration in support of West 
Papua’s struggle for independence 
from Indonesia—not a new issue in 
Vanuatu, which is the only country 
in the Pacific in which an interna-
tional issue has taken on political 
significance and is openly supported 
by most political parties, from both 
the government and Opposition. This 
demonstration marked the start of a 
new round of activities, which culmi-
nated in a gathering of West Papuan 
political leaders in mid-December. 
The purpose of the conference was to 
allow all pro-independence groupings 
inside and outside West Papua to unite 
under one umbrella in preparation 
for submitting an application to the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group to join 
the subregional group as a full mem-
ber (vdp, 17 Sept 2014). The Vanuatu 
government pledged financial backing 
for the conference, and Prime Min-
ister Natuman made an impassioned 
plea in late September at the United 
Nations General Assembly in support 
of the West Papuan cause (vdp, 19 
Sept, 1 Oct 2014). 
The Indonesian government, 
through its embassy in Canberra, 
expressed its displeasure at the 
 Vanuatu government’s intended sup-
port for the West Papuan conference 
(vdp, 1 Dec 2014). Prime Minister 
Natuman responded that he “would 
consider altering the Vanuatu-Indone-
sia Bilateral Agreement, if Indonesia 
continues to interfere in Vanuatu’s 
stand on West Papua issues” (vdp, 
9 Dec 2014). On 6 December, the 
leaders of the three major pro-inde-
pendence groups (the Federal Republic 
of West Papua, the National Parlia-
ment of West Papua, and the National 
Coalition for Liberation) deliberated 
in the Chiefs’ Nakamal in Port Vila 
and signed an agreement to establish 
a new body called the United Libera-
tion Movement for West Papua (vdp, 
8 Dec 2014). Carcasses joined the 
government in expressing his support 
for the meeting and congratulated the 
West Papuans for their achievement in 
obtaining unity (vdp, 12 Dec 2014). 
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In early November, the prime 
minister requested that the Speaker 
call Parliament for a regular session, 
scheduled for 18 and 19 December, to 
consider the 2015 budget (vdp, 5 Nov 
2014). Not surprising, rumors of 
the possible tabling of a new motion 
of no confidence surfaced, but with 
the puzzling news in the local press 
that amounts of money between 
vt500,000 and vt1 million, totaling 
vt14.5 million, had allegedly been 
paid into the accounts of a number 
of mps (vdp, 11 Nov 2014). Ten days 
later, it was announced that the prime 
minister and the deputy prime minister 
had lodged a motion in Parliament to 
suspend sixteen Opposition mps for 
alleged bribery. The motion contained 
the facts, verified by the police, that 
the leader of the Opposition, Moana 
Carcasses, had deposited a check for 
vt35 million in his personal account 
at a local bank and subsequently 
transferred money to Opposition mps 
as described above, which he claimed 
were loans. It was alleged in the news-
paper that Carcasses had not denied 
these facts and had openly stated that 
he was offering the money as loans 
“to any mp of either the Opposition 
or the Government sides who will 
pledge their allegiance to him” (vdp, 
21 Nov 2014).
The basis of the motion for suspen-
sion was chapter 10 of the Vanuatu 
Constitution (article 66 [1 and 2]), 
which establishes the Leadership Code 
and requires leaders in government to 
conduct themselves so as to avoid any 
activity that might demean their office 
or the integrity of the Republic of 
Vanuatu. In particular, leaders should 
not engage in any activity involving a 
conflict of interest or for personal gain 
(Constitution, chapter 10, article 66 
[1 and 2]). 
It came as no surprise that the 
next day, the leader of the Opposition 
tabled a motion of no confidence in 
the prime minister, giving five reasons: 
that the prime minister (1) was  causing 
harm to the country for  refusing to 
enforce the airport  concession, risk-
ing damages expected to total more 
than 3 billion vatu; (2) had interfered 
in the function of the Public Ser-
vice by removing the chairman and 
members of the Citizenship Com-
mission; (3) had failed to act on the 
e-visa scheme in China and to deal 
with alleged misuse of funds; (4) had 
stopped the decentralization of council 
of ministers’ meetings in the provinces; 
and (5) was leading the country in 
the wrong direction by favoritism and 
focusing on the past rather than the 
future. 
The Speaker pointed out that 
the motion of no confidence in the 
prime minister had come two days 
after the motion to suspend sixteen 
mps and would, therefore, be dealt 
with after that of the prime minister. 
Under Parliamentary Standing Orders, 
three days is required before a writ-
ten motion can be debated. He also 
pointed out that the two movers of 
the second motion were among those 
listed in the motion of the prime min-
ister for suspension, which could have 
an impact on the final outcome (vdp, 
22 Nov 2014).
Indeed, when the motion was 
debated, the leader of the Opposition, 
Moana Carcasses, and his deputy, 
Serge Vohor, were suspended, along 
with fourteen other mps. The motion 
claimed that by accepting the “loans,” 
the accused mps had broken the 
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Leadership Code, which stipulates 
that “a leader must not accept a loan 
(other than on commercial terms from 
a recognised lending institution) and 
only if the leader satisfies the lending 
institution’s usual business criteria” 
(Supreme Court, Leadership Code Act 
[cap 240], part 3—Breaches of Lead-
ership, section 21). 
Carcasses’s response was that he 
would seek redress in the court, argu-
ing that the rights of the suspended 
mps had been infringed, “as only the 
court has the right to punish anyone 
and not the parliament” (vdp, 26 Nov 
2014). When asked about the source 
of the money he had distributed, 
Carcasses claimed that “the money 
belonged to me. I sold my properties” 
(vdp, 27 Nov 2014). The sixteen mps 
left Parliament and remained absent 
for the remainder of the session.
The Supreme Court, however, 
decided that the suspension of the mps 
“had breached the petitioners’ consti-
tutional rights under various Articles 
of the Constitution specified in their 
petition”; therefore, “the suspension 
was invalid, void, and of no effect” 
(vdp, 3 Dec 2014). In response, the 
Speaker called for a judicial review, 
expressing his concern that the court 
decision had intruded in the affairs 
of Parliament—that is, that it inter-
fered with the “separation of pow-
ers between the legislature and the 
judiciary under the constitution of the 
country . . . and that Parliament had 
a duty to act to protect its integrity by 
deciding to discipline those members 
concerned” (vdp, 4 Dec 2014). 
Following the court decision, the 
sixteen mps removed the motion of no 
confidence due to a lack of numbers 
to pass it. However, Prime Minister 
Natuman responded strongly to the 
accusations against him. He labeled 
the airport concession agreement 
signed by the Carcasses-led govern-
ment as a “scam” and noted that in 
July, Parliament, including Carcasses, 
had voted to allow the agreement to 
lapse after receiving the report of an 
Ad Hoc Committee engaged to inves-
tigate the project, which reported that 
“99% of the contract did not favor the 
government, the people and  Vanuatu 
but ‘only foreigners and it could cause 
a catastrophe.’” The prime minister 
also cautioned that “there were people 
around trying to get the Opposition 
to return to government to reopen 
the agreement.” He noted as well that 
although the sixteen mps were offi-
cially back in Parliament, the police 
were resuming their investigation 
against them relating to the complaint 
of alleged bribery (vdp, 5 Dec 2014). 
With the closure of Parliament, 
the political tension in the air sub-
sided. However, the serious allega-
tions of bribery against the sixteen 
mps remained to be resolved, with the 
Public Prosecutor’s office preparing a 
case that was expected to be presented 
in court around mid-March 2015. The 
impact of a conviction would be sub-
stantial, with the possibility of either 
a “fine not exceeding vt5,000,000” 
or “imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 10 years” (Supreme Court, 
Leadership Code Act [cap 240], part 
6—Punishment of Leaders, section 
41[a] and [b]). This was the first time 
that accusations of bribery against 
elected government officials had 
reached this stage of investigation 
and possible prosecution, though the 
suspicion of money changing hands 
during votes of no confidence and 
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coalition formation is constant and 
widespread. Whatever the result, the 
publicity surrounding the potential 
court case raised the consciousness 
among the public, at least in Port Vila, 
as to the seriousness of the allegations. 
There seemed to be little awareness, 
however, of the significance that a 
negative court judgment could have: 
the potential for sixteen mps (30% of 
Parliament) to lose their seats. Politics 
in the first few months of 2015 are 
sure to be of great interest. 
howard van trease
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